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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is composed by three essays and provides empirical and methodological contri-
butions to the Industrial Organization literature. The ﬁrst essay (chapter 2) analyzes the
welfare impacts of the Brazilian Biodiesel law. The second essay (chapter 3) develops an al-
ternative estimator for dynamic games. The third essay (chapter 4) applies the methodology
developed in chapter 3 to build a dynamic oligopoly model for Brazilian banking industry.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and provides some directions for future work.
Chapter 1 analyzes market eﬀects of Brazilian biodiesel regulations. Biodiesel was intro-
duced in Brazil in 2005, mixed with mineral diesel to produce the BX blend (X stands for
the percentage of biodiesel). Even in small quantities, the percentage of biodiesel has a pos-
itive impact on ﬁnal price of BX because the production costs of biodiesel are higher than
those of mineral diesel. In order to analyze the welfare consequences of this price increase,
I use a static partial equilibrium framework. The results show that the current proportion
of biodiesel in the diesel mixture (5%) increases consumers' price by 1.7% and decreases the
consumption by 1.5% compared to the scenario without biodiesel. Also, an increase in the
biodiesel percentage to 10% would raise the price by 3.5% and reduce the consumption by
3%.
Chapter 3 provides an alternative estimator for dynamic games. Estimation of dynamic
games is a numerically challenging task, in chapter 3 we propose an alternative class of
asymptotic least squares estimators to Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler's (2008). The es-
timator we propose is based on the equilibrium condition of the game when represented in
the space of payoﬀs - in contrast with Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler's (2008) that work
in the probability space. Our estimator reduces signiﬁcantly the computational burden.
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This reduction is specially signiﬁcant under the linear-in-parameter speciﬁcation where our
estimator has an OLS/GLS closed form that does not require any optimization. Also, we
show that our estimator is asymptotically equivalent to Pesenrorfer and Schmidt-Dengler's
(2008). This implies that there is no theoretical cost of using our estimator. Monte Carlo es-
timations show that our estimator has good small sample properties and provides signiﬁcant
reduction in the computational time when compared to Pesenrorfer and Schmidt-Dengler's
(2008) estimator.
Chapter 4 applies the methodology developed in chapter 3. We estimate a dynamic
oligopoly model for the Brazilian banking industry. The results are used to build coun-
terfactuals to examine the eﬀects of the privatization of public banks on the number of
bank branches in small municipalities. We ﬁnd that public banks are not strategic and their
presence generate positive spillovers on the private banks' proﬁts. The model however, is
not able to disentangle the nature of this spillover. Also, the counterfactual shows that the
number of branches operating in small markets would drop in a privatization scenario.
Chapter 5 is the conclusion, I discuss the limitations of the current work and provide some
directions for future research.
2
Chapter 2
Impacts of Biodiesel on the Brazilian
fuel market
The paper is published in Energy Economics 2013 (36) 666-675
Abstract
This paper investigates market eﬀects of the Brazilian biodiesel law, which made the use
of biodiesel, blended with petroleum diesel, mandatory in Brazil. The study estimates the
demand curve for diesel fuel (biodiesel and petroleum diesel) and the industry supply curve
of biodiesel. These two pieces of information have been used in a static analysis to draw
scenarios with diﬀerent biodiesel mandates. The results show that the current proportion of
biodiesel in the diesel mixture (5%) increases consumers' price by 1.7% and decreases the
consumption by 1.5% compared to the scenario without biodiesel. Also, an increase in the
biodiesel percentage to 10% would raise the price by 3.5% and reduce the consumption by
3%.
2.1 Introduction
Recent concerns about the environment, high fossil fuels prices, and energy security led to the
creation of biodiesel programs in several countries (Althoﬀ, Ehmke,and Gray (2003),Lamers,
McCormick, and Hilbert (2008), Ayhan (2007)). In Brazil, biodiesel was introduced in 2005
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(Brazil (2005)), mixed with mineral diesel to produce the BX blend, where X stands for the
percentage of biodiesel.
During a transition period, from 2005 to 2007, a 2% addition of biodiesel to the mineral
diesel (B2) was optional. After that, a certain percentage of biodiesel was required in all the
diesel fuel1 sold in Brazil. The biodiesel mandate has increased over time (Brazil (2005)). In
the ﬁrst six months of 2008 the commercial diesel fuel had to contain 2% of biodiesel (B2).
The biodiesel proportion was required to increase to 3% (B3) on 1 July 2008, to 4% (B4)
one year later, and to 5% (B5) since January 2010 (three years before the initial goal, MME
(2005)).
Brazilian federal government gave ecological, economic and social reasons to introduce
the biodiesel mandate (MME (2005)). From the environmental perspective, the biodiesel is
supposed to have smaller impact on greenhouse gas emissions since it is a renewable fuel pro-
duced mainly from vegetable oils (Ayhan (2007)). From the economic point of view, the fuel
was expected to diminish petroleum diesel importation. In 2005 about 6% of the petroleum
sold in the Brazilian was imported. Also, Brazil could become an exporter of biodiesel since
other countries are adopting similar programs. Finally, the biodiesel production could be an
instrument to reduce regional inequality through income and employment generated by the
biodiesel production chain. Fiscal beneﬁts were implemented for all biodiesel producers who
use raw materials from small farmers in poor regions.
However, biodiesel adoption may have negative impacts. First, it could increase the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases if the production causes deforestation (Fargione et al. (2008)).
Secondly, biofuel demand increases feedstock prices (Pfuderer, Davies, and Mitchell) and
may cause land use change. For example, Almeida, Bomtempo, and Silva (2008) show some
evidence of substition of traditonal crops (such as oranges) to sugarcane in São Paulo state.
Also, biodiesel may cause loss of welfare as its current production costs are higher than
petroleum diesel (Althoﬀ, Ehmke,and Gray (2003)). This is a non-exhaustive list as other
problems might be caused by biodiesel use.
Since biodiesel adoption generates beneﬁts and problems it is necessary to produce studies
quantifying these eﬀects. The need is even more evident when one analyzes the economic
importance of the diesel. The fuel is the base of Brazilian transportation system, used in
trucks, boats, buses, tractors and some power plants  the last mainly in North (Amazon)
1The term diesel fuel in this article refers to the biodiesel-diesel mixture. The terms mineral diesel,
petroleum diesel, and oil diesel are used as synonyms.
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region. Even in small proportion, biodiesel may have signiﬁcant impacts on the Brazilian
Economy.
The present paper contributes to the biodiesel literature by providing a measure of the
welfare impact of biodiesel adoption. The empirical strategy consists in estimating the
demand for diesel fuel and the costs of the biodiesel industry. With these two pieces of
information it is possible to draw scenarios changing the biodiesel mandate. Then, the
scenarios can be used to evaluate the eﬀects of the biofuel plan and to predict the impact of
future changes.
The economic impacts quantiﬁed in this paper are based on traditional partial equilibrium
analysis: a change in the biodiesel policy changes the market equilibrium (price and quan-
tity), which implies a change in the consumer and producer surplus 2. De Gorter and Just
(2009) provide a general framework for the use of partial equilibrium analysis in the biofuel
context.
The demand estimate is based on Brazilian States' monthly panel data. The period
analyzed spans from January 2003 to December 2009. The data include diesel prices, amount
of diesel sold (pure diesel before 2008 and BX mixture onwards), the ﬂeet of heavy vehicles,
and ICMS (tax on trade of products and services) as a proxy for economic activity.
The biodiesel industry supply curve was approximated with data from the last (17th)
biodiesel auction. This information is combined with the average price of petroleum diesel
in the reﬁneries, and with wholesale and retail prices of the biodiesel mixture to simulate
the impacts on price and quantity of BX sold caused by changes in the biodiesel mandate.
The results obtained show that the current proportion of biodiesel in the diesel mixture
(B5) increases consumers' price by 1.7% and decreases the consumption by 1.5% when com-
pared to the environment without biodiesel. An increase in the biodiesel percentage to 10%
(B10) would raise the price by 3.5% and reduce the consumption by 3%. These all add up
to considerable welfare loss to consumers, retailers, and wholesalers.
The paper builds on a static approximation of a dynamic process: industry capacity and
marginal costs are held constant over the simulations, and we ignore entry cost, adjustment
costs and strategic price behavior.
The biodiesel industry problem, however, is intrinsically dynamic. Firms have to decide
whether to enter the market or not. Once a ﬁrm has entered, it has to set the capacity, the
2A comprehensive introduction to welfare analysis can be found in Mas-Colell, Whinston,and Green (1995)
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technology, and the location and, in each period of time, it decides to continue or to exit
the market. Firms decisions will aﬀect the market competition and consequently the prices.
Therefore, a natural extension of this paper is a dynamic oligopoly model in the tradition of
Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Maskin and Tirole (1988). The model must deal with intrinsic
heterogeneity in the industry regarding capacity, location and technology employed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the biodiesel market and
shows the dataset used in the paper. Section 2.2 estimates the demand curve for diesel
fuel. Section 2.4 recovers the costs and estimates the supply curve for the biodiesel industry.
Section 2.5 presents the results of the simulations. Finally, section 2.6 concludes the paper,
provides some directions for future work, and discusses some limitations of the approach.
2.2 The Biodiesel Market
Brazil has a long experience in the use of biofuels. During the 1970's the Proalcohol program
(Brazil (1975)) developed bioethanol as a substitute to gasoline in automobiles. Even though
the legislation has experienced several changes over the last four decades, ethanol is still a
very important part of Brazil's energy matrix (ANP (2010)), and in 2006 ethanol represented
17% of Brazilian fuel supply (Almeida, Bomtempo, and Silva (2008)).
Biodiesel, on the other hand, was adopted later in Brazil. Silva César and Batalha (2010)
show that a ﬁrst attempt to implement biodiesel production was made in 1980. However,
it was abandoned in 1986 due to reduction in the petroleum barrel price. During the 2000s
new concerns about renewable energy led to the creation of the National Program for the
Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) (MME (2005)). The main result of the program
was law n°11.097/2005 (Brazil (2005)), which made the use of biodiesel mandatory from
2008.
It is worth noting that ethanol and biodiesel are not market competitors. Ethanol is a
substitute to gasoline, used basically in automobiles. Biodiesel is a substitute to oil diesel,
used mainly in trucks and buses. Since 1976, the use of diesel engines in automobiles has
been forbidden by law (Brazil (1976)). Therefore, ethanol belongs to a diﬀerent market and
is not analyzed in the present paper.
The recent introduction of biodiesel generated a growing literature about the topic. Silva
César and Batalha (2010) summarize the history of the biodiesel in Brazil. Ayhan (2007)
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discusses some beneﬁts of biodiesel and governmental policies regarding biodiesel. Barbosa
(2011) and Pfuderer, Davies, and Mitchell (2009) look at the impacts of biofuels in the
feedstock market. Fargione et al. (2008) analyse the impact of biofuels in the greenhouse
gas emissions.
From the economic perspective, it is possible to use partial equilibrium analysis, a useful
economic tool, to assess market outcomes of the use of biodiesel. De Gorter and Just (2009)
propose a general framework to analyze the impact of diﬀerent biofuel mandates alongside
taxes. The authors show how diﬀerent mandates and tax schemes impact prices, and use
data to recover supply elasticities from gasoline and ethanol. Similarly, Althoﬀﬀ, Ehmke, and
Gray (2003) use partial equilibrium analysis to quantify the losses to the Indiana economy
caused by a 2% biodiesel mandate. Their estimative shows a total cost ranging from $ 15.2
to 17.2 million.
In this tradition, the present paper contributes to the literature by using partial equilib-
rium analysis to quantify the impact of the biodiesel mandate on the market equilibrium
outcomes. Due to the rich dataset employed in the paper it is possible to show how equilib-
rium prices and quantities are changed according to the biodiesel mandate, given that other
factors remain constant (see section 2.5). This also provides some quantitative measures of
biodiesel's impact on welfare.
2.2.1 Commercialization
The Brazilian oil and biofuel market is regulated by ANP3 (Brazil (1997)). For biodiesel
speciﬁcally, the agency is responsible for determining biodiesel standards, inspecting the
market (to assure that the correct biodiesel mandate is sold), and for collecting data. Also,
ANP provides licences to construct new biodiesel plants, to change the capacity of existing
ones, to produce, and to commercialize the biofuel.
ANP also plays a direct role in biodiesel commercialization. Wholesalers are responsible
for mixing biodiesel and oil diesel (ANP (2010)). However, they are not allowed to negotiate
directly with the producers. Instead, they have to buy biodiesel through actions organized
by ANP.
ANP determines the amount of biodiesel that must be sold and the auction rules. The
biodiesel producers are the bidders. They bid a mix of price and quantity according to the
3National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels
7
speciﬁc rules of the auction. The winners are those bidders with the lowest prices. The buyers
are oil reﬁneries4. Each reﬁnery is assigned a percentage of the total volume of biodiesel by
ANP. After the auction the oil reﬁneries resell the biodiesel to the wholesalers (ANP (2010)).
Seventeen auctions were performed between 2005 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2010 (ANP
(2010)). From the 12th auction onwards ANP divided each auction in two. The ﬁrst part
of the split auctions were restricted, only the bidders that bought raw material from small
farmers were allowed to participate. In the second part, all registered producers could
participate as bidders (see Silva César and Batalha (2010) for details). Where necessary, the
split auctions have a diﬀerent notation through the paper: after the ANP number they have
a (i) symbol, where i = 1 means that the auction is restricted and i = 2 means that the
auction is non restricted. Also, they are considered diﬀerent auctions because they have a
separated dynamics.
Table 2.1 summarizes the results of the biodiesel auctions. It can be seen that the num-
ber of bidders and the volume auctioned increased over time, reﬂecting the increase in the
biodiesel mandate. The prices, on the other hand, did not follow this pattern. Both the
ceiling and the average price increased from the 6th to the 12th auctions and then the prices
returned to the initial levels.
Empirical analysis of the biodiesel auctions is virtually impossible due to their peculiarities
5. Firstly, there were drastic changes in the auction format. The ﬁrst eight auctions were
electronic auctions; ANP implemented live auctions for the following eight auctions and
returned to electronic format for the last one. Secondly, the bidding rules, the regularity of
the auctions, the delivery schedule, and the guarantee of producers also changed over time.
Finally, the number of auctions is not large enough for empirical analysis.
However, even without an accurate analysis, the results of the auctions are used in section
2.4 to recover information regarding the supply curve of the biodiesel industry.
2.2.2 Market Data
ANP collects fuel market data on a monthly basis. The information includes the amount
of each fuel sold by state, the total quantity of each fuel produced by oil reﬁnery, the total
4Technically, the buyers in the auctions are all the producers and importers with market share above 1%. In
practise, the oil reﬁneries of two companies (Petrobras and Refap ) fulﬁll these conditions (ANP (2010)).
5For empirical estimation of auctions see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), Laﬀont, Ossard, and Voung
(1995), and Donald and Paarsch (1993)
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Table 2.1: Results of Biodiesel Auctions
Auction Date Price (R$ Jan 2003/m3) Volume Auctioned (m3) N°of Bidders
Celing Average
1 23/11/2005 1624.80 1611.97 70000 8
2 30/03/2006 1593.16 1552.78 170000 12
3 11/07/2006 1588.07 1462.13 50000 6
4 12/07/2006 1587.79 1456.19 550000 25
5 13/02/2007 1555.97 1521.36 45000 7
6 13/11/2007 1907.07 1483.61 304000 26
7 14/11/2007 1907.07 1480.52 76000 30
8 10/04/2008 2165.74 2078.10 259000 24
9 11/04/2008 2165.74 2074.01 66000 20
10 14/08/2008 1977.55 1965.95 264000 21
11 15/08/2008 1977.55 1969.77 66000 20
12(1) 24/11/2008 1794.61 1784.83 264000 23
12(2) 24/11/2008 1794.61 1787.96 66000 23
13(1) 27/02/2009 1737.39 1636.30 252000 27
13(2) 27/02/2009 1737.39 1387.99 63000 32
14(1) 25/05/2009 1712.05 1673.58 368000 27
14(2) 25/05/2009 1712.05 1680.81 92000 32
15(1) 27/08/2009 1657.58 1631.36 368000 27
15(2) 27/08/2009 1657.58 1639.82 92000 32
16(1) 17/11/2009 1685.85 1670.46 460000 29
16(2) 17/11/2009 1685.85 1663.75 115000 34
17(1) 12/02/2010 1614.04 1572.47 419900 29
17(2) 12/02/2010 1614.04 1556.73 106000 43
Notes: The data is from National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP (2010).
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volume of fuel imported, average fuel prices by state (price collected over a signiﬁcant sample
of gas stations) and the average price charged by producers and importers of petroleum
products at regional level6.
The data on quantity of fuel sold start in January 2000. All wholesale fuel distributors
have to report to ANP the amount of fuel sold per month in each state. The data, therefore,
cover all Brazilian territory and include all types of liquid fuels used in the market.
Data on prices started being collected by ANP in July 2001 and the number of cities and
gas stations consulted has increased over time. In July 2001 the research covered 411 cities,
the total increased to 555 municipalities in May 2004.
Data on the total ﬂeet of buses (including those used in public transportation), tractors and
trucks by state from January 2003 to December 2009 were also collected. This information is
from Denatran (National Department of Traﬃc) and it is available at the state level. Besides,
as a measure of monthly economic activity level, information was gathered on ICMS (Tax
on Trade of Products and Services) for the same period. All prices used in the paper are
adjusted to January 2003 constant reais (Brazilian currency).
To serve as instruments for demand estimation I obtained data on the total value of
petroleum imports and on the average wage of new employees in the wholesale fuel distri-
bution and in the fuel retail industries. The value of imports is from ANP and is available
with a monthly frequency at the national level. The wages are from the Brazilian Ministry
of Labour and Employment; this data have monthly frequency and it is available at the state
level.
Figure 2.1 shows the consumption of the three main liquid fuels used in land transport
in Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE) from 2000 to 2009. As said before, gasoline and ethanol
are not substitutes to diesel in the Brazilian market. However, the graph illustrates the
importance of diesel fuel. Diesel is consumed more than gasoline and ethanol put together.
Nevertheless, ethanol has the highest increase in consumption (250% in the period), followed
by the diesel (26%) and gasoline (12%).
Table 2.2 shows the consumption of diesel per Brazilian Region in 2007. In terms of
absolute consumption, the Southeast uses most of the diesel, approximately 43% of the
total consumption. Among the states, São Paulo, in the Southeast region, has the highest
consumption, about 22% of the national consumption. However, considering consumption
6Each region is formed by groups of states with geographical, historical and economic similarities.
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Figure 2.1: Gasoline, Ethanol and Diesel Consumption in BOE
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Source: Elaborated based on data from the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP (2010).
per capita, the Central-West region has the highest use of diesel followed by the South
region. The Southeast region has the second lowest per capita consumption. Table 2.2
provides evidence that the regional eﬀects are important for the diesel fuel demand.
Table 2.2: Diesel Consumption by Region
Consumption Consumption
(1000000 BOE) per capita
North 3.87 0.26
Northeast 6.23 0.12
Central-West 4.67 0.35
Southeast 18.10 0.23
South 8.68 0.32
Notes: The data are from National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP (2010).
Figure 2.2 shows the diesel fuel price dynamic in Brazil. The left hand side of the ﬁgure
shows the average price charged by retailers, the minimum and the maximum price found
in the survey and the average retail margin (the diﬀerence between the price charged by the
gas stations and the wholesale price). The right hand side of the ﬁgure shows the standard
deviation of the prices.
11
Figure 2.2: Price (R$ January 2003)
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One can see that the movements of the average, minimum and maximum price are similar
with a reasonably stable diﬀerence among them. The variance of the price reinforces this
feature. It is small compared to the average, less than 0.05 most of the time, with a slight
increase at the end of the period.
The average retail margin is stable during the whole analyzed period, indicating that the
gas stations are able to transfer the positive shocks on costs to consumers. Conversely they
do not retain a negative shock on prices. The ﬁgure indicates that the gas stations are
charging a ﬁxed markup over the marginal cost.
If one does not consider the retail margins of the other fuels, the result on stable margins
diﬀers from those found by Hosken, McMillan, and Taylor (2008). The authors discovered a
substantial variability in the retail margins. This diﬀerence, however, may be explained by
data aggregation and might not reﬂect the individual behavior of the retailers.
Table 2.3 shows some basic statistics regarding the biodiesel industry. All the indicators
have grown over the period. The number of plants in 2009 is more than nine times the total
number of factories in 2005. The production experienced an even higher increase, more than
2000 times the initial quantity. In 2005 the production by the Brazilian biodiesel industry
was only 756 m3 and it rose to 1.6 million m3 in 2009.
The capacity, on the other hand, had a much slower increase when compared to the
production. The capacity was around 85,000 m3 in 2005 and increased to about 460,000 m3
in 2009 (almost 55 times the initial capacity). The capacity utilization, however, is still low,
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Table 2.3: Industry Summary Statistics
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Production (1000 m3) 0.7 69.0 404.3 1,167.1 1,607.8
Number of Plants 7 18 45 62 64
Capacity (1000 m3) 84.7 638 2,475.1 3,315.3 4,629.8
Capacity Utilization (%) 0.9% 10.8% 16.3% 35.2% 34.7%
Source: Elaborated based on data from the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP (2010).
around 35% in 2009.
This growth in the indicators was expected as the percentage of biodiesel in the BX also
increased. However, the low percentage of the capacity utilization raises questions about
the ﬁrms' strategy and about the future of the industry market structure. The capacity
production of biodiesel is enough to attend levels of BX higher than 5%. Therefore, in
the absence of new increases in the biodiesel mandate, some ﬁrms are expected to exit the
industry.
2.3 Demand Estimation
The demand for diesel is a result of a number of diﬀerent maximization processes. Diesel is
used as input in several industries: agriculture, land transportation (freight and passengers),
ship transportation and energy generation. In addition to industrial use, diesel can also
be utilized by domestic consumers for idiosyncratic reasons (for example, small boats for
recreational ﬁshing). In this sense, the estimation of demand for diesel cannot rely on a
structural model.
Following the considerations above, the demand for diesel can be seen as a function of
variables such as economic activities and ﬂeet level.
lnQit = f (pit, Xit) + εit (2.3.1)
Where lnQit represents the natural logarithm of the quantity (m
3) of diesel sold in state i
in period t, pit is the average price charged by gas stations in state i during the period t. The
vector Xit is composed by covariates that inﬂuence demand. It includes the logarithm of
ICMS as a measure of economic activity level, the logarithm of the total ﬂeet (the sum of the
buses, tractors and trucks by state) to capture the importance of diesel in transportation,
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and state dummies as regional characteristics may aﬀect the demand for diesel fuel. To
mitigate endogeneity problems with the variable ICMS, it does not include fuel taxes. εit is
the error term. f(.) is a demand function.
A similar approach to estimate gasoline demand has been used in many studies as sum-
marized by Basso and Oum (2007). The traditional approach takes the demand for gasoline
as a function of price, income and controls. Also, most of the speciﬁcations rely on log-
linear forms and Greene (1982) and Dahl and Sterner (1991) support the selection of the
log-linear form. Based on that, the present paper also estimates a log-linear speciﬁcation for
the demand function. Equation 2.3.1 becomes:
lnQit = α0 + α1ln(pit) +Xitβ
′
+ τi + λt + υit (2.3.2)
ln represents the natural logarithm and the error εi,t is decomposed into three terms: an
individual speciﬁc term τi, a time speciﬁc term, λt, and an individual time speciﬁc term ,υi,t.
In order to assure the consistency of demand parameters estimated, one assumption is
necessary:
D1: Consumers are only interested in the amount of energy the fuel produces.
Assumption D1 says that consumers see any biodiesel mandate as the same product 7.
This assumption assures that the coeﬃcients of equation 2.3.2 are stable, that they do not
change according to the diesel mandate.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the demand estimation. The ﬁrst column of the table
is the result of the OLS regression with the use of state dummies, which is equivalent to
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator 8. The coeﬃcient of the price is negative, as expected. The
value is approximately 0.6 indicating that an increase of one percent in the real price of
diesel implies a reduction of 0.6% in the consumption of diesel. The variable ﬂeet has an
unexpected negative signal: an increase in the number of heavy vehicles decreases the use of
biodiesel. However, the coeﬃcient is statistically insigniﬁcant. On the other hand, the log
of ICMS has the expected signal. A one percent increase in the total tax collected causes
an increase of 0.03% in the total consumption of diesel. Since ICMS is charged on products
7Tests conducted by the Ministry of Science and Technology indicated that there are no loss of eﬃciency
in diesel engines due the use of any BX blend up to B5 (ANP (2010))
8See Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002) for details about panel methods
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and services eﬀectively traded, the results show a positive relation between economic activity
and diesel consumption.
The second column in table 2.4 shows the results of the random eﬀects estimation. One
can see that the price and economic activity eﬀects are stronger under the random eﬀects
hypothesis. Furthermore, the ﬂeet has the expected sign and it is signiﬁcant at 5%. However,
the Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of no systematic diﬀerences between random and
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Instrumental variables (IV) are used to control the endogeneity problem caused by simul-
taneous equations. The instruments are supply-side cost shifters: the log of the wholesale
average price, the log of the wage of new employees in the fuel distribution industry (retail
and wholesale), and the log of average import price per m3 of petroleum. All instruments
aﬀect the supply of diesel fuel, as they aﬀect the marginal cost of the industry. However,
they have no eﬀects on the demand side. In other words, the instruments do not alter
the consumers' decisions. Therefore, the instruments can be considered exogenous. The
regression of the retail price on the instruments (table 2.5) has an F-statistic equal to 9496,
considerably higher than the 10 or 20 value pointed by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) to
rule out weak instruments.
The results for the IV with state dummies can be found in the third column of table 2.4.
The price elasticity is considerably higher when compared to OLS regression: the value of
the parameter is now about -0.9, 50% higher than the estimation without instruments. The
log of ﬂeet continues to be insigniﬁcant and with the wrong sign. The log of ICMS is almost
the same when compared with the OLS regression.
Finally, the fourth column in table 2.4 presents the random eﬀects estimation of the
model using instrumental variables. The price elasticity is around one and the log of ﬂeet
is signiﬁcant and with the right sign. The log of ICMS is close to the value obtained in the
random eﬀects estimation with no instruments and higher than the ﬁxed eﬀects estimations.
This diﬀerence between the estimators with instruments is strongly signiﬁcant according to
the Hausman test (chi-square value of 407.12).
One can draw two conclusions based on the diesel fuel demand estimation. First, the
regional eﬀects are important. The Hausman test strongly rejects equality among the ﬁxed
and the random eﬀects estimators 9. Second, the use of instrumental variables changed the
9The random eﬀects estimator is consistent and eﬃcient under the hypothesis of independence of the indi-
vidual characteristics. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimator does not need this assumption to achieve consistence.
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Table 2.4: Demand Estimation
OLS RE IV RE-IV
Log Price -0.5599* -0.6398* -0.8594* -1.0573*
(0.1701) (0.1760) (0.1998) (0.1998)
Log Fleet -0.0123 0.0535* -0.0109 0.0521*
(0.0171) (0.0171) 0.0170) (0.017)
Log ICMS 0.0394* 0.0730* 0.0417* 0.0748*
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0127)
State Dummies Yes No Yes No
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2259 2259 2257 2257
R-Squared 0.9864 0.6723 0.9866 0.6634
Hausman 402.98 407.12
Notes: The dependent Variable is the log of the total m3 of diesel. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at 5%. Instruments are the log
of the wholesale price, the log of the import expenditure of petroleum
and the log of the wage of new employees in the fuel distributor industry.
Table 2.5: Regression of the Instruments on the Logarithm of the Price
OLS
Ln Wholesale Price 0.9111*
(0.0063)
Ln New wages 0.0020
(0.0004)
Ln Oil Import Price -0.0073*
(0.0027)
F-Statistic 9496
Notes: The dependent variable is
logged diesel price. Standard errors
in parentheses. *Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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results considerably. The OLS seems to underestimate the price elasticity.
Based on the conclusions above, the coeﬃcients obtained in the ﬁxed eﬀects IV estimation
are used to construct the simulations in section 6.
2.4 The Production Side
Data on the last two auctions (17(1) and 17(2)) was used to approximate the industry
supply curve. The are two reasons for this choice. First, these two auctions are electronic
and therefore have better information regarding the bids; it is possible to access all the bids
of every ﬁrm. Second, the paper relies on a static exercise and to include the past auctions
I should make considerations regarding the capacity adjustments cost and the entry costs of
the ﬁrms.
Since the cost structure of the ﬁrms is not observed, some assumptions are required to
recover the supply curve. First, I assume a strategic interaction among the ﬁrms and a
feature of the non-observed cost structure:
P1: Firms are in perfect competition.
P2: Marginal cost is constant and ﬁrms can produce up to 100% of their capacity.
Assumption P1 is based on the low capacity utilization in 2009, around 36%. The ﬁrms
are obliged to enter into a ﬁerce competition in order to sell their production. The ﬁrst part
of assumption P2, constant marginal costs, is a standard assumption in both theoretical10
and empirical11 economic literature. The second part of assumption P2 refers to the fact
that ﬁrms do not waste money building a capacity that they will not use.
Assumptions P1 and P2 are, however, not enough to characterize the supply curve as
some ﬁrms did not enter in the the last two auctions. To overcome this diﬃculty, the
ﬁrms are divided in four groups, according to their participation in the auction, and speciﬁc
assumptions are made for each group.
Therefore the ﬁxed eﬀect is a more robust estimator. See Wooldridge (2002) for use of the Hausman test
in the panel context.
10For example, Sutton (1991), Krugman (1979), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Tirole (1988).
11For example, Ryan (2012), Nevo (2001), and Jia (2006).
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2.4.1 Group 1
The ﬁrst group is composed of the ﬁrms that had license to produce but not to commercialize.
They could not have participated in the auctions. For this group the following assumption
is made:
P3: The marginal cost is equal to the auction ceiling price. Therefore, ﬁrms in group 1 can
oﬀer any amount of biodiesel between zero and their full capacity at the ceiling price.
Formally:
si(b) =

qi = 0 if b < bc
0 ≤ qi ≤ Ci if b = bc
qi = Ci if b > bc
(2.4.1)
Where si(b) is ﬁrm i's supply function, Ci is ﬁrm i's capacity, qi is ﬁrm i's quantity
supplied, bc is the auction ceiling price, and b is a given price.
Equation 2.4.1 may underestimate or overestimate the supply function of the plants in
this group as no information about the price behavior is known. However, this problem is
minimized as a small fraction of ﬁrms belong to this group (see appendix).
2.4.2 Group 2
The second group consists of ﬁrms that could have entered the auction (they have the
commercialization license) but decided not to enter. The assumption made for this group is
exactly equal to P3:
P4: The marginal cost is equal to the auction ceiling price. Therefore, ﬁrms in group 2 can
oﬀer any amount of biodiesel between zero and their full capacity at the ceiling price.
Formally:
si(b) =

qi = 0 if b < bc
0 ≤ qi ≤ Ci if b = bc
qi = Ci if b > bc
(2.4.2)
Where si(b) is ﬁrm i's supply function, Ci is ﬁrm i's capacity, qi is ﬁrm i's quantity
supplied, pb is the auction ceiling price, and b is a given price.
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For this group the minimum oﬀer price may be higher than the ceiling price. The ceiling
price can be seen as a lower bound for the minimum oﬀer price. P3 implies that the lower
bound is actually equal to the minimum oﬀer price for group 2 and the ﬁrms did not enter
the auction due to entry costs 12.
2.4.3 Group 3
This group incorporates the ﬁrms that entered in the auction but did not win. For group 3
the following assumption is made:
P5: The marginal cost is equal to the ﬁrm's lowest bid. Therefore, ﬁrms in group 3 can oﬀer
any amount of biodiesel between zero and their full capacity at a price equal to their
lowest bid.
Formally:
si(b) =

qi = 0 if b < b
i
m
0 ≤ qi ≤ Ci if b = bim
qi = Ci if b > b
i
m
(2.4.3)
Where si(b) is ﬁrm i's supply function, Ci is ﬁrm i's capacity, qi is ﬁrm i's quantity
supplied, pim is the ﬁrm i's lowest bid, and b is a given price.
Assumption P3 is a good approximation of the marginal cost as the ﬁrms signaled their
to provide biodiesel at this price level. Also, assumption P2 assures that this marginal cost
is the same for the entire capacity.
2.4.4 Group 4
This group consists of ﬁrms that won the auction. For this group the following assumption
is assumed:
P6: The marginal cost is equal to the ﬁrm's lowest winning bid. Therefore, ﬁrms in group 4
can oﬀer any amount of biodiesel between zero and their full capacity at a price equal
to their lowest winning bid.
12see Li and Zheng (2009) for entry costs in auctions
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Formally:
si(b) =

qi = 0 if b < b
i
w
0 ≤ qi ≤ Ci if b = biw
qi = Ci if b > b
i
w
(2.4.4)
Where si(b) is ﬁrm i's supply function, Ci is ﬁrm i's capacity, qi is ﬁrm i's quantity
supplied, biw is the ﬁrm i's lowest winning bid, and b is a given price.
For this group the minimum oﬀer price may be lower than the winning bid. Therefore,
their marginal cost might be overestimated.
In the next subsection we combine the assumptions made above to recover the industry
supply curve.
2.4.5 Industry Supply
The industry (or market) supply curve is the horizontal sum of ﬁrm supply curves (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)). For the biodiesel industry it can be deﬁned as follows:
Si(b) =
J∑
i=1
si(b) (2.4.5)
Where Si(b) is the market supply function, si(b) is ﬁrm i's supply function, b is a given
price, and J is the total number of producers.
Due to the discontinuous characteristics of the ﬁrms' supply, the industry supply function
does not have a closed form. However, under the assumptions assumed, it is possible to
compute the amount of biodiesel oﬀered at any given price. Figure 2.4 shows the biodiesel
supply curve.
The supply curve expresses a ceteris paribus condition: it shows the relations between
the price of a good and its quantity supplied, given that the other factors are constant.
Therefore, a change in the these other factors shifts the position of the supply curve. A
linear cost reduction for all ﬁrms, for example, shifts the demand to the left. For any given
price there is a reduction in the quantity oﬀered. The opposite happens if the costs increase.
The factors that aﬀect the biodiesel supply include the raw material price, the opportunity
cost of the producer, labor cost, and technology. Biodiesel is produced by a chemical reaction
of lipids (vegetable oil or animal fat) with an alcohol (Ayhan (2007)). Therefore, if the price
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Figure 2.4: Biodiesel Industry Supply Curve
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Source: Elaborated based on data from the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP (2010).
of a feedstock used in biodiesel production increases, the supply curve shifts to the right.
Also, if the producer can use the plant to produce oils for non-fuel purposes, a decrease
in the price of this alternative option would shift the supply curve to the right. A similar
reasoning can be made for all the relevant factors shifting the supply curve.
Even though the factors aﬀecting the supply curve are very important, they are not ad-
dressed in this paper for two reasons. First, there is no data available to map the factors
to the cost structure. In other words, the quantitative result of these changes cannot be
determined. Second, the paper makes a short run partial equilibrium analysis. I analyze
how the market outcomes change with a change in the biodiesel mandate given that the
other factors are constant (see section 2.5). The hypothesis of all other factors remaining
constant is not strong in the short run, as the producer of other goods would take time to
adjust prices.
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2.5 Welfare Analysis
Biodiesel producers are part of a broader fuel industry which includes wholesalers, retailers,
oil reﬁneries and fuel importers. To analyze the impacts of biodiesel mandates on the retail
prices it is necessary to consider the interactions among all these agents. More speciﬁcally, it
is necessary to know how all the agents in the market react to a change in biodiesel mandate.
It is useful to divide the agents in the market according to their position in the diesel fuel
supply chain. Firms involved in direct production or importation of the fuel (oil reﬁneries,
fuel importers and biodiesel producers) form the upstream part of the supply chain. On the
other hand, ﬁrms that commercialize the fuel previously produced (wholesalers and retailers)
form the downstream part of the supply chain.
The analysis is done backwards. The ﬁrst step is to see what happens in the downstream
part of the market. In other words, how retailers and wholesalers react to a given change
in the prices of upstream ﬁrms 13. Figure 2.5 shows the average prices of petroleum diesel
charged by retailers, wholesalers, producers and importers in Brazil between January 2003
and December 2007, before the mandatory adoption of biodiesel. The lines of the three
prices show a quite similar pattern, also the distance between the retail and the wholesale
price is stable over the period. It corroborates the points discussed in section 2.2.2 about
the retail markups. The wholesale margin is not so stable; it seemed to increase in the last
months of the analyses.
Figure 2.5 provides the base for the following hypothesis:
S1: (i) Wholesalers and retailers charge a markup (margin) over their acquisition costs; (ii)
wholesalers buy petroleum diesel, while biodiesel and retailers buy the BX blend; (iii)
the markup at a given point in time is composed of a time invariant part and a time
speciﬁc error, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean.
Hypothesis S1 provides the best response of retailers and wholesalers to any price chosen
by ﬁrms in the upstream market. It is worth noting that the hypothesis ﬁts the data and
simpliﬁes the strategies of the downstream ﬁrms.
For the upstream market the following hypothesis is made:
S2: Oil reﬁneries and diesel importers do not react (change prices) to a change in the
biodiesel mandate.
13See Tirole (1988) for a more detailed discussion of vertical restraints.
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Figure 2.5: Average Diesel Prices (R$ January 2003)
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Hypothesis S2 is reasonable, as the data does not show any change in the oil diesel
producers' price caused by the introduction of biodiesel. Therefore, it is assumed that the
oil diesel price is constant in all the simulations.
2.5.1 Counterfactuals
Given assumptions S1 and S2, the diesel fuel price paid by the consumers (BX price) in a
given month can be written as:
pit = αbit + (1− α)dit + µrit + µwit (2.5.1)
Where bt stands for the biodiesel producers' price in period t, dt stands for the oil diesel
producers' price in state i in period t, µr,i,t is the retailers' markup in state i in period t, µ
w
,i,t
is the wholesalers' markup in state i in period t, and α is the biodiesel mandate.
Equation 2.5.1 assumes that the one price law holds for biodiesel in all Brazilian territory
and at regional level for oil diesel. Also, it implies that the fuel is not commercialized through
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auctions but directly negotiated between buyers and sellers.
The elements necessary to perform the simulation are given by equations 2.3.2, 2.4.5 and
2.5.1. Basically the exercise consists in ﬁnding a market equilibrium price for each biodiesel
mandate keeping the other factors constant. For a given level of markup, oil diesel price and
α, equation 2.5.1 gives the fuel diesel price as a function of the biodiesel price. Therefore,
for the market equilibrium it is necessary to reach a biodiesel price that equates the quantity
supplied (equation 2.4.5) and the quantity demanded (equation 2.3.2).
The computational details are as follows. First, I used just a month in the simulation
to minimize possible dynamic distortions. The variables ﬂeet, ICMS and petroleum diesel
prices are those observed in November 2009. Second, the markup is the average margin for
the period from January 2003 to December 2007 for the retailers and between January 2007
and December 2007 for the wholesalers. I used only one year to estimate the wholesalers'
margin to capture its increase observed in the data. Finally, the coeﬃcients for the demand
are those estimated through ﬁxed eﬀects with IV (Table 2.4).
The algorithm used for the simulations is simple. It starts with a low biodiesel price and
calculates the demand and supply for this price. If the diﬀerence between supply and demand
is high, the price increases by a small amount and new values are calculated for demand and
supply. The algorithm continues until the diﬀerence between the quantity supplied and the
quantity demanded becomes negligible.
2.5.2 Results
The simulation results are shown in Table 2.6. The chart presents the scenarios with diﬀerent
mandatory percentages of biodiesel. The baseline is the scenario without biodiesel (100% of
petroleum diesel). The second scenario has a 5% biodiesel mandate. For the other scenarios,
the mandate was increased by 1% each scenario, up to a mandate of 15%, and a ﬁnal
simulation was run for a mandate of 20%.. In all simulations the possible loss of eﬃciency
in the diesel engines, due to the increase of the proportion of biodiesel, is not considered.
It should be noted that the biodiesel price presented in the table corresponds to the
producer price, free of wholesalers' and retailers' margins. The BX price, on the other hand,
is the consumer's ﬁnal price considering both margins and the proportion of biodiesel and
petroleum diesel in the fuel. Furthermore, the BX price is the Brazilian average price. Since
equation 2.3.2 allows for state eﬀects, an equilibrium price and quantity is obtained for each
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state and the equilibrium quantity is used as a weight to calculate the national average price.
Table 2.6: Simulation Results
Biodiesel BX Capacity
% Price * Quantity** Price* Quantity** Utilization (%)
0% - - 1.75 3,459.70 0%
5% 1.57 170.5 1.78 3,409.20 44%
6% 1.58 203.9 1.78 3,398.70 52%
7% 1.58 237.2 1.79 3,388.40 61%
8% 1.59 270.2 1.80 3,377.90 70%
9% 1.59 303.1 1.80 3,367.60 78%
10% 1.59 335.7 1.81 3,357.10 86%
11% 1.59 368.2 1.97 3,347.30 95%
12% 2.14 388.5 2.07 3,237.20 100%
13% 3.47 388.5 2.09 2,988.20 100%
14% 4.62 388.5 2.26 2,774.70 100%
15% 5.64 388.5 2.45 2,589.70 100%
20% 9.33 388.5 3.58 1,942.30 100%
Notes: (*)R$ Jan 2003/L, (**) 1000 m3. Values obtained through simulation based on equilibrium conditions. The ﬁrst
line (B0) presents the petroleum diesel price.
One can see that B5 increases the consumer price by 1.7%, from R$ 1.75 to R$ 1.78.
The raise in price leads to a reduction in consumption of about 50.000 m3, around 1.5%. If
one doubles the current biodiesel mandate, from 5% to 10%, the price eﬀect is more than
proportional: fuel diesel price increases 3.6% reaching R$ 1.82. Consumption, on the other
hand, decreases by 3% due to the use of B10.
The simulations also allow understanding of relations among capacity utilization, price
and consumption. The increase in the capacity utilization from 44% (with B5) to 95% (with
B11) increases the producer price by R$ 0.02 (about 1%). Therefore, the supply curve of
the industry seems to be smooth on price up to 95% of its full capacity.
As stated before, B5 drives the capacity utilization to 44%. When one doubles the compul-
sory percentage, the capacity utilization goes to 86%. This less than proportional increase
in the capacity utilization is due to the increase in price that reduces the consumption of
the total mixture.
Further increases in the compulsory proportion of biodiesel increase the capacity utilization
and lead to operation of ﬁrms with higher marginal costs. The eﬀects on prices are higher
after 11% of biodiesel. The biodiesel price increases 34% when B11 is substituted for B12.
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It happens because with a 12% biodiesel mandate the industry starts to work to its full
capacity, the price need to go up to equalize the demand and the oﬀer. Since biodiesel is a
small proportion of the total BX, its price needs a great increase to generate a signiﬁcant
drop in the BX demand. At a mandatory 20% blend, the price to the consumer is more than
the double of the pure petroleum diesel, and the total consumption falls about 44%.
The impacts of diﬀerent diesel mandates on consumer surplus, and in the proﬁts14 are also
analyzed. The focus is the diﬀerence between the baseline scenario (no biodiesel) and the
alternative scenarios with diﬀerent percentages of biodiesel. Also, as there is no closed form
for the consumers' utility, it is not possible to analyze the equivalent and the compensating
variations. Alternatively, consumer surplus15 is used as a measure of consumers' loss of
welfare due to the change in price of diesel fuel caused by the biodiesel mandates. Finally,
oil reﬁneries' proﬁts were not considered as no information regarding their costs is available.
The results are summarized in table 2.7.
The second column in table 2.7 shows the total consumer surplus (the sum over Brazilian
states). The current proportion of biodiesel (B5) causes a loss of R$ 104 million to the
consumers. An increase to 10% in the mandatory percentage of biodiesel would cost R$ 212
million to consumers in terms of welfare. The loss increases very fast after 11% and achieves
the impressive number of R$ 2 billion with B15 and R$ 4 billion with B20.
For a proportion of biodiesel up to 10%, the biodiesel industry's proﬁts are quite small
when compared to the consumer loss. At the current percentage (5%) the proﬁts of all
producers are around R$ 5 million. The double of the present percentage of biodiesel would
increase the proﬁts to 10 million. After that, however, one can observe a remarkable increase
in the total proﬁts; they achieve R$ 3.3 billion when one considers the scenario with 20%
of biodiesel. The retailers and wholesalers are also aﬀected by the introduction of biodiesel.
Together they have a reduction of R$ 39 million in total proﬁt at the current level of biodiesel.
At a 20% level of biodiesel the total proﬁt loss to retailers and wholesalers is above one billion.
Altogether, the losses to consumers, wholesalers and retailers outweigh the proﬁts for the
biodiesel producers in any level of biodiesel proportion considered. However, other beneﬁts
created by the use of biodiesel could make the adoption of biodiesel a socially optimal
14For biodiesel producers, Fixed costs are not considered. Therefore, proﬁt is equal to revenue (price times
quantity) minus marginal costs times quantity. If one consider the presence of ﬁxed costs, the proﬁt in
the table becomes producer surplus. For retailers and wholesalers the variations in proﬁts are equal to
the margin times the change in the quantity sold.
15See Varian (1992).
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Table 2.7: Simulation Results
Biodiesel Consumer Biodiesel Producers' ∆ Retailers' ∆ Wholesalers'
Mandate Surplus(*) Proﬁt(*) Proﬁt(*) Proﬁt(*)
5% -104 5 -9 -30
6% -125 7 -11 -36
7% -146 8 -13 -42
8% -168 9 -15 -49
9% -190 10 -16 -55
10% -212 10 -18 -61
11% -233 254 -20 -67
12% -470 801 -40 -133
13% -1042 1272 -84 -281
14% -1579 1682 -122 -408
15% -2077 2044 -155 -519
20% -4241 3365 -271 -905
Notes: (*)R$ Jan 2003/L. Results obtained by simulation.
decision. For example, environmental beneﬁts, such as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions,
or improvement of air quality may generate a signiﬁcant welfare. Also, the income transfer
to small farmers might be socially desirable. These considerations are above the scope of
this paper and may be included in future work.
2.6 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research
The compulsory adoption of biodiesel in the Brazilian fuel market can bring many changes
to the economy. Most of these changes are, however, still unknown. This paper addresses
market equilibrium outcomes: the eﬀects on price, consumption and welfare in the short run.
The analysis of the demand shows that even though diesel is an important raw material
in the transport and agriculture industries (with almost no substitute in the short run) it
has a considerable high price elasticity when controlled by other factors.
The industry supply estimation was based on the results of the last two auctions in the
dataset. This simpliﬁcation was adopted to avoid capturing possible dynamic eﬀects on the
static analysis done in the paper. The supply curve constructed is considerably smooth up
to the industry total capacity. After that, a change in the compulsory proportion has a huge
impact on prices due to capacity constraints.
The simulations show that the current level of biodiesel raises the ﬁnal price to consumers
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by 1.7% and decreases the consumption by 1.5%. If the government doubles the compulsory
proportion the new price would be 3.5% higher with a decrease in consumption of 3%.
Additionally, the welfare analysis showed that the consumers, wholesalers and retailers have
a huge loss in consumer surplus and in proﬁts due to the adoption of the biodiesel. With a
5% biodiesel blend, the total loss is around R$ 143 million.
The results obtained in this study should be taken with caution as they depend on the set
of assumptions. Some assumptions may be considered controversial and they are required
for two reasons. First, the complexity involved in the adoption of biodiesel (and biofuels
in general). It is impossible for a quantitative study to deal with all the aspects involved
in a biofuel program, which include a large supply chain and political questions. Second,
some hypotheses are necessary due lack of data. For example, no data on the individual
decisions taken by farmers is available. The paper, therefore, should be seen as an indication
of the costs involved in the biodiesel program. More studies are necessary for a better
understanding of the overall impact.
The political implications of the program are not considered in this paper. The price
increase observed in the simulations could not be politically acceptable. Therefore, the price
formation assumption (free negotiation) might not hold. Also it is unknown how the increase
in the oil production and oil reﬁning in Brazil would aﬀect the biofuel programs (the country
is a net exporter of oil and may become a net exporter of petroleum diesel). This increase
could change the government support to the biodiesel program.
The paper also does not consider the program eﬀects in all the parts of the supply chain.
This includes the eﬀects of biodiesel in feedstock, land use, employment and the expenditure
in subsidies. For, example the alternative uses of the raw materials involved in the biodiesel
production must aﬀect the biodiesel price, and consequently the ﬁnal blended diesel price.
Future work, should look with attention to this important part of the supply chain.
Furthermore, the paper did not apply a dynamic framework. Future work should improve
the analysis in this aspect in order to create more realistic scenarios. Combined, all this
information could be a better guide for energy policy decisions.
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Table 2.8: Groups 1, 2, and 3
Plant Monthly capacity(*) Marginal Cost(**) Group
Biolix 900 1592.92 1
Brasil ecodiesel 1 9000 1592.92 1
Brasil ecodiesel 2 8100 1592.92 1
Coomisa 360 1592.92 1
Cooperfeliz 200 1592.92 1
Ouro verde 510 1592.92 1
Abdiesel 72 1592.92 2
Agrenco 19608 1592.92 2
Big Frango 1200 1592.92 2
Bionorte 2451 1592.92 2
Cooperbio 120 1592.92 2
Fusermann 900 1592.92 2
Granol 7500 1592.92 2
Grupal 300 1592.92 2
Kgb 150 1592.92 2
Nutec 72 1592.92 2
Rondobio 300 1592.92 2
Soyminas 1200 1592.92 2
Taua 3000 1592.92 2
Tecnodiesel 330 1592.92 2
Usibio 600 1592.92 2
Vermoehlen 150 1592.92 2
Araguassu 3000 1533.34 3
Bio Oleo 300 1494.74 3
Brasil Ecodiesel 3 10800 1543.09 3
Clv 3000 1570.53 3
Innovatti 900 1552.78 3
Ssil 150 1396.85 3
Notes: (*) m3,(**)R$ Jan 2003/L. VElaborated based on data from the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP
(2010).
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Table 2.9: Group 4
Plant Monthly capacity(*) Marginal Cost(**) Group
Abdiesel 180 1402.74 4
Adm 28650 1543.09 4
Agropalma 900 1588.78 4
Agrosoja 2400 1581.55 4
Amazonbio 1350 1402.74 4
B-100 900 1354.39 4
Barralcool 4902 1577.34 4
Beira Rio 360 1400.71 4
Binatural 9000 1480.71 4
Biocamp 4620 1588.78 4
Biocapital 24720 1581.55 4
Biocar 900 1470.53 4
Biopar parana 3600 1583.86 4
Biopar parecis 700 1590.11 4
Biotins 810 1332.92 4
Bioverde 7353 1579.65 4
Bracol 16807 1568.43 4
Brasil Ecodiesel 4 10800 1591.51 4
Brasil ecodiesel 5 13320 1587.30 4
Brasil ecodiesel 6 10800 1592.92 4
Bsbios 13320 1578.95 4
Caramuru 18750 1573.69 4
Cesbra 1800 1396.85 4
Comanche 10050 1535.51 4
Cooperbio 1 10200 1586.18 4
Cooperbio 2 120 1403.86 4
Dvh 1050 1403.86 4
Fertibom 4200 1563.02 4
Fiagril 12299 1578.95 4
Granol 1 18390 1590.11 4
Granol 2 28000 1573.69 4
Oleoplan 19800 1587.30 4
Petrobras 1 9051 1568.43 4
Petrobras 2 9051 1568.43 4
Petrobras 3 9051 1543.79 4
Sp Bio 2082 1400.14 4
Transportadora Caibiense 3000 1402.74 4
Notes: (*) m3,(**)R$ Jan 2003/L. Elaborated based on data from the National Agency for Oil and Biofuels ANP
(2010).
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Chapter 3
An Alternative Asymptotic Least
Squares Estimator for Dynamic
Games
Co-authored with Sorawoot Srisuma (University of Surrey) and Fabio A. Miessi Sanches
(University of São Paulo)
Abstract
The estimation of dynamic games is known to be a numerically challenging task. In this
paper we propose an alternative class of asymptotic least squares estimators to Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler's (2008), which includes several well known estimators in the literature
as special cases. Our estimator can be substantially easier to compute. In the leading case
with linear payoﬀs speciﬁcation our estimator has a familiar OLS/GLS closed-form that does
not require any optimization. When payoﬀs have partially linear form, we propose a sequen-
tial estimator where the parameters in the nonlinear term can be estimated independently
of the linear components, the latter can then be obtained in closed-form. We show the class
of estimators we propose and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler's are in fact asymptotically
equivalent. Hence there is no theoretical cost in reducing the computational burden. Our
estimator seem to perform well in a simple Monte Carlo experiment.
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3.1 Introduction
We consider the estimation problem for a class of dynamic games of incomplete information
that generalizes the single agent discrete Markov decision models surveyed in Rust (1994); for
a recent survey see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010). The setup is in an inﬁnite time horizon,
where players' private values enter the payoﬀ function additively and are independent across
players, under the conditional independence framework. A Markov equilibrium of such game
can be represented by a ﬁxed point of nonlinear equations in the space of choice probabilities
and has been shown to exist (e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). A variety of methods have been proposed by diﬀerent authors to
estimate the same class of games based on the equilibrium condition in recent years; examples
are given below. However, a common component of these methodologies is a nonlinear
optimization problem that may act as a considerable deterrent for applied researchers to
estimate dynamic games due to involved programming needs and/or long computational
time.
In this paper we propose a class of asymptotic least squares estimators constructed based
on the equilibrium condition of the game when represented in the space of payoﬀs. Our
work is motivated by the well-received methodology developed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2008), who propose an eﬃcient estimator and provide a unifying framework that
includes the non-iterative pseudo-likelihood estimator of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)
and the moment based estimators discussed in Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) as special
cases. In contrast to ours, Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler use the choice probability
representation of the equilibrium to construct their estimator. Our goal is to show there
is much to gain computationally using our approach at no cost. Henceforth we use the
abbreviation ALSEPSD when referring to a generic estimator of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler.
We claim our estimator can be substantially easier to compute than ALSEPSD. In the
leading case our estimator has a familiar OLS/GLS closed-form expression when the per-
period payoﬀ function takes a linear-in-parameter speciﬁcation.1 In an intermediate case
1The linear payoﬀs structure may seem restrictive, but it is in fact quite general as it includes any nonlinear
(basis) functions of observables; albeit perhaps with an atheoretic ﬂavor. However, linear speciﬁcation
arises naturally in many applications, and/or does not cause much concern in terms of structural inter-
pretability in other situations. A leading example for the latter is when the goal of an empirical analysis
is to study market outcomes, such as competition study of market power. Some notable recent empiri-
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when the payoﬀ function has an additive partially linear form, Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem
can be applied so the parameters in the nonlinear part can be estimated ﬁrst (dimensional
reduction), and the linear-in-parameter component can be obtained in closed-form in the
second step.2 Even in a more general nonlinear case, we argue that our estimator is still
generally easier to compute than ALSEPSD. ALSEPSD also provides a good benchmark
for a comparison with other estimators in the literature as it has a well-deﬁned eﬃciency
property. We establish a duality between our estimator and ALSEPSD, in the sense that
they can always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution. Therefore our
eﬃcient estimator is as eﬃcient as the eﬃcient ALSEPSD.
The large sample properties of our estimator (and for asymptotic least squares generally)
are easy to derive for discrete games. Technically, our estimation problem is a least squares
problem with generated regressors and regressands, which are generally smooth functions of
the ﬁnite dimensional ﬁrst stage parameters that are nonparametrically identiﬁed. In addi-
tion, the number of square terms in the objective function does not grow with sample size
but is determined by the cardinality of the action and state spaces. Therefore our estimator
belongs to the class of asymptotic least squares estimators as deﬁned in Gourieroux and Mon-
fort (1985,1995) in the same sense as ALSEPSD. The close connection between our estimator
and ALSEPSD goes even further given the smooth bijective relation between normalized ex-
pected payoﬀs and choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993)'s inversion); ALSEPSD is
deﬁned to minimize the distance between the probabilities implied by the pseudo-model and
the data. We show that, locally around the true, using the inverse function theorem, our
estimator can be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution as any ALSEPSD by
choosing an appropriate weighting matrix and vice versa.
There are at least two reasons why the estimation of dynamic games can be non-trivial.
First, as well-known from the single-agent problem, it involves value functions that generally
do not have closed-form and need to be numerically evaluated so it is computationally
demanding (see Rust (1996)). For games, there is also a potential issue of indeterminacy of
multiple equilibria that gives rise to incomplete models (Tamer (2003)). A novel approach
popularized by Hotz and Miller (1993) performs inference on the pseudo-model, generated
cal applications of linear-in-parameter payoﬀs include Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Ryan (2012) and
Collard-Wexler (2013).
2Modeling of additive linear components in the payoﬀs often appear in games with entry/exit decisions, as
ﬁxed cost or scrap value, or more generally as ﬁxed eﬀects.
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from to the observed data, by estimating the (policy) value functions that can signiﬁcantly
simplify the computational aspect. Pseudo-models are also generally easier to handle in a
strategic environment as they have been shown to be complete for several classes of games
(Srisuma (2013)). Methodologies based on pseudo-models are often referred to as two-step
estimators since they require estimation of value functions in the ﬁrst stage. Many recently
proposed estimators for dynamic games are two-step estimators.
However, despite the simpliﬁcation of two-step methods, the numerical aspects for im-
plementing existing estimators in the literature appear to remain a concern as they gen-
erally involve solving highly nonlinear optimization problems. It is not uncommon to see
methodology papers using estimation time, amongst other things, as a competing factor.
Furthermore, it is also not unusual that the choice of players' per-period payoﬀ speciﬁcation
is chosen with the ease of numerical implementation in mind. In particular there can be
substantial beneﬁts (in terms of computational time) in specifying player's payoﬀ functions
to be linear-in-parameters. As the action-speciﬁc expected payoﬀs can then be written as
a linear transformation of the parameter, following from the linear structure that deﬁnes
the expected payoﬀs using stationary Markovian beliefs; examples of such discussions can be
found in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007, Section 3.3.1) and Pakes, Ostrovsky, Berry (2007,
Section 3). As a result, a linear parameterization of the payoﬀs is a leading speciﬁcation
employed in empirical work (see Footnote 1 for examples).
The objective functions that are used to deﬁne many two-step estimators in the literature
are constructed in terms of choice probabilities implied by the pseudo-model. These prob-
abilities can be motivated by the equilibrium condition of the game, which can be stated
in terms of consistent beliefs with probabilities of best responses. Choice probabilities are
used to deﬁne traditional criterion functions such as pseudo-likelihood function (Aguirre-
gabiria and Mira (2007), Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012)) or moment and minimum distance
based conditions (Pakes, Ostrovsky, Berry (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)).
However, in order to calculate the probabilities implied by the pseudo-model, one must ﬁrst
compute the expected discounted payoﬀs that determine the region of integration to be in-
tegrated to compute the probabilities. Furthermore, the integral is generally a nonlinear
map of the expected payoﬀs, and it typically has to be computed numerically outside the
well-known conditional logit framework. The integral, following Hotz and Miller (1993)'s
inversion result, in fact represents a one-to-one mapping between the probabilities and the
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normalized expected payoﬀs.
There are also other methodologies that use expected payoﬀs explicitly to deﬁne their
objective functions. The ﬁrst such two-step estimator has been developed by Hotz, Miller,
Sanders and Smith (1994), who estimate the expected payoﬀs by forward simulation, to
estimate a dynamic decision problem for a single agent. Hotz et al. deﬁne their estimator
using conditional moment restrictions. They also recognize it is possible to have a closed-
form estimator when payoﬀ functions have linear-in-parameter speciﬁcation in the form of
an IV estimator (see equation (5.8) in the Monte Carlo Study section of Hotz et al. (1994)).
In the context of dynamic games we are only aware of two other current methodologies that
base their objective functions explicitly on expected payoﬀs. First is the two-step estimator
proposed by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), who also use forward simulation like Hotz et
al. However, generally no closed-form estimator is possible with Bajari, Benkard and Levin's
methodology as they compare expected payoﬀs in the pseudo-model and those generated by
local perturbations. The other is Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong and Nekipelov (2009), who
provide nonparametric identiﬁcation results for a more general game with continuous state
space and propose an eﬃcient one-step estimator.3,4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 begins with an illustrative
example that motivates our estimator, and then describes the model and our estimator for
games. Section 3.3 gives the main results. Section 3.4 presents results from Monte Carlo
experiments that compare the statistical performance and relative speed of our estimator
compared to ALSEPSD. Section 3.5 apted or applied to complement other recent results in
the literature. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Methodology
We begin with an illustration that highlights the idea behind computational advantages
of our estimation approach. Section 3.2.1 describes elements of the game. We deﬁne the
pseudo-model in Section 3.2.2 and introduce our estimator in Section 3.2.3.
3An earlier version of Bajari et al. (2009), Bajari and Hong (2006), proposes a two-step estimator that can
be seen as the dynamic game version of Hotz et al. (1994).
4Another notable estimator that does not take a two-step approach is Egesdal, Lai and Su (2012). However,
Egesdal et al. construct their objective functions in terms of choice probabilities.
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3.2.1 Least Squares in Probabilities vs Payoﬀs
Consider a model generated by the following binary choice variable:
at (θ) = 1 [vθ (xt) ≤ εt] for θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rp,
where xt and εt are independent. Let the cdf of εt be denoted by Q. For all x, let
Pθ (x) = Pr [at (θ) = 1|xt = x], so that Pθ (x) = Q (vθ (x)). Assume the support of xt
is ﬁnite, say {xj}Jj=1 for some J < ∞, so that we can deﬁne Pθ = Γ (vθ), where Pθ =
(Pθ (x
1) , . . . , Pθ
(
xJ
)
)>, vθ = (vθ (x1) , . . . , vθ
(
xJ
)
)> and Γ (vθ) = (Q (vθ (x1)) , . . . , Q
(
vθ
(
xJ
))
)>.
Suppose: we observe a random sample of {at, xt} where at = at (θ0) for some θ0 ∈ Θ,
which is the parameter value of interest; vθ is nonparametrically identiﬁed up to θ, and there
exists a consistent estimator of vθ, say v̂θ, for all θ; and, Q is known and invertible. Let
P = (P (x1) , . . . , P
(
xJ
)
)> be a vector of choice probabilities identiﬁed from the data, so
that P = Pθ0 , then one may consider a class of estimators deﬁned by
θ̂p (V) = arg min
θ∈Θ
(
P˜− P̂θ
)>
V
(
P˜− P̂θ
)
, (3.2.1)
where P˜ and P̂θ are estimators for P and Pθ respectively, and V be some positive deﬁnite ma-
trix. Note that P˜ and P̂θ0 are generally diﬀerent since the former is model-free while the lat-
ter is estimated through v̂θ. Similarly, we can deﬁne v = (Q
−1(P (x1)), . . . , Q−1(P
(
xJ
)
))>,
which is also identiﬁed from the data, so that v = vθ0 by construction. Then one can also
consider an alternative class of estimators:
θ̂v (W) = arg min
θ∈Θ
(v˜ − v̂θ)>W (v˜ − v̂θ) , (3.2.2)
where v˜ is Γ−1(P˜) and W is a positive deﬁnite matrix. As described previously, v˜ and v̂θ0
will also generally diﬀer.
Equations (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) provide two diﬀerent estimators for θ0. We argue the latter
should generally be easier to compute than the former since it is more convenient to compute
(v˜, v̂θ) relative (P˜, P̂θ) across diﬀerent values of θ. This argument is most transparent when
vθ has a linear-in-parameter speciﬁcation, i.e. vθ (xt) = θ
>v (xt) for some p−dimensional vec-
tor v (xt). Then v̂θ can be written as X̂θ, where X̂ is a J by p matrix such that its j−th row
equals v̂ (xj)
>
. The solution to (3.2.2) is unique and has a closed-form,
(
X̂>WX̂
)−1
X̂>Wv̂,
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when X̂>WX̂ is invertible. Even without the linear parameterization of vθ, every evaluation
of P̂θ requires the mapping of vθ (x
j) by Q for all j, for every θ, where Q is generally a
nonlinear function that may have to be computed numerically. In contrast, for (3.2.2), the
potentially costly step of applying Q−1 has to be performed only once to estimate v that does
not depend on θ. Regardless of the parameterization in vθ, under some suitable regularity
conditions, and appropriate choices of weighting matrices, the two estimators can be shown
to be asymptotically equivalent near θ0 in the sense that there exists WV and VW such that
for any V and W :
√
N
(
θ̂v (WV)− θ0
)
=
√
N
(
θ̂p (V)− θ0
)
+ op (1) ,
√
N
(
θ̂p (VW)− θ0
)
=
√
N
(
θ̂v (W)− θ0
)
+ op (1) ,
where N denotes the sample size.
The estimator in (3.2.1) is closely related to ALSEPSD and other Hotz and Miller (1993)'s
type estimators that have been widely adopted in the dynamic game setting. In contrast the
estimator based on (3.2.2) is the asymptotic least squares analog to the estimator proposed
in Hotz et al. (1994). For the remainder of this section we develop an estimator based on
(3.2.2) in the context of a dynamic game.
3.2.2 Framework
We consider a game with I players, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}, over an inﬁnite time
horizon. The elements of the game in each period are as follows:
Actions. For notational simplicity we assume all players have the same action space.
The action set of each player is A = {0, 1, . . . , K + 1}. We denote the action variable for
player i by ait. Let at = (a1t, . . . , aIt) ∈ A = ×Ii=1A. We will also occasionally abuse the
notation and write at = (ait, a−it) where a−it = (a1t, . . . , ai−1t, ai+1t . . . , aIt) ∈ A\A.
States. Player i's information set is represented by the state variables sit ∈ S, where
sit = (xit, εit) such that xit ∈ X is common knowledge to all players and εit ∈ E = RK+1
denotes private information only observed by player i. Note that common state space X
is without any loss of generality. We shall use sit and (xt, εit) interchangeably. We deﬁne
(st, s−it, εt, ε−it, E) analogously to (at, a−it, A), and denote the support of st by S = X × E .
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State Transition. Future states are uncertain. Players' actions and states today
aﬀect future states. The evolution of the states is summarize by a Markov transition law
P (st+1|st, at).
Per Period Payoff Functions. Each player has a payoﬀ function, ui : A × S → R,
which is time separable. The payoﬀ function for player i can depend generally on (at, xt, εit)
but not directly on ε−it.
Discounting Factor. Future period's payoﬀs are discounted at the rate βi ∈ (0, 1) for
each player. For notational simplicity we take βi = β for all i.
We impose the following assumptions throughout the paper.
Assumption M1 (Additive Separability). ui,θi (ai, a−i, x, εi) = pii,θi (ai, a−i, x)
+
∑
a′∈A εi (a
′) 1 [ai = a′] for all i, θi, ai, a−i, x, εi, where pii,θi is known up to θi ∈ Θi ⊂ Rpi.
Assumption M2 (Conditional independence). The transitional distribution of the states
has the following factorization: P (xt+1, εt+1|xt, εt, at) = Q (εt+1)G (xt+1|xt, at), where Q is
the cumulative distribution function of εt and G denotes the transition law of xt+1 condi-
tioning on at and xt.
Assumption M3 (Independent private values). The private information is independently
distributed across players, and each is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure whose density is bounded on RK+1. So that Q (ε) =
∏I
i=1Qi (εi), where Qi denotes
the cumulative distribution function of εit.
Assumption M4 (Discrete public values). The support of xt is ﬁnite so that X ={
x1, . . . , xJ
}
for some J <∞.
M1 - M4 are standard in the modeling of dynamic discrete games in the literature. Note
that M2 implies xt and εt are independent, however, this can be relaxed slightly at the
cost of more notation by changing all of our statements regarding Q and Qi to be taken
conditional on xt. M4 is also not essential for the general idea behind estimation of dynamic
games. Although the complexity of the asymptotic theory and the practical aspects increase
signiﬁcantly when xt includes continuous random variables; see Bajari et al. (2009) and
Srisuma and Linton (2012).
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At time t every player observes sit, each then chooses ait simultaneously. We consider a
Markovian framework where players' behaviors are stationary across time and players are
assumed to play pure strategies. More speciﬁcally, for some αi : S → A, ait = αi (sit) for
all i, t, so that whenever sit = siτ then αi (sit) = αi (siτ ) for any τ . The beliefs are also time
invariant. Player i′s beliefs, σi, is a distribution of at = (α1 (s1t) , . . . , αI (sIt)) conditional on
xt for some pure Markov strategy proﬁle (α1, . . . , αI). The decision problem for each player
is to solve
max
ai∈Ai
{Eσi [ui,θi (ait, a−it, si) |sit = si, ait = ai] + βEσi [Wi,θi (sit+1;σi) |sit = si, ait = ai]},(3.2.3)
where Wi,θi (si;σi) =
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tEσi [ui,θi (aτ , siτ ) |sit = si] ,
for any si. The subscript σi on the expectation operator makes explicit that present and
future actions are integrated out with respect to the beliefs σi; in particular, player i forms
an expectation for all players' future actions including herself, and todays actions of opposing
players. Wi,θi (·;σi) is a policy value function since the expected discounted return needs not
be an optimal value from an optimization problem since σi can be any beliefs, not necessarily
equilibrium beliefs. Note that the transition laws for future states are completely determined
by the primitives and the beliefs. Any strategy proﬁle that solves the decision problems for
all i and is consistent with the beliefs satisﬁes is an equilibrium strategy. It is well-known
that players' best responses are pure strategies almost surely and Markov perfect equilibria
for games under M1 - M4 (e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). However, there may be multiple equilibria.
3.2.3 Pseudo-Model
We now deﬁne the pseudo-model that plays a central role in two-step estimation meth-
ods. The starting point is the structural assumption that we observe random sample
of {α∗1 (s1t) , . . . , α∗I (sIt) , xt, xt+1} from a single equilibrium, where α∗i = αi,θi0 for some
θi0 ∈ Θi ⊂ Rpi for all i. Let P ∗i (ai|x) = Pr [α∗i (sit) = ai|xt = x] for all ai, x. Then we have:
(i) the equilibrium beliefs for all players is summarized by
∏I
i=1 P
∗
i ; (ii) Pr [ait = ai|xt = x] =
P ∗i (ai|x) and Pr [xt+1 = x′|xt = x, at = a] = G (x′|x, a) for all a, x, x′. For notational sim-
plicity, for this section and the next, we shall: omit ∗; let αi and Pi denote the equilib-
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rium strategy and choice probability function for player i; and, without any ambiguity let
ait = αi (sit) for all i, t. Then the pseudo-model can be deﬁned as a collection of joint con-
ditional distributions indexed by θ = (θ>1 , . . . , θ
>
I )
> ∈ ×Ii=1Θi = Θ ⊂ Rp. Also let θ0 denote
(θ>10, . . . , θ
>
I0)
>.
Definition: The pseudo-model is {Pθ}θ∈Θ such that Pθ =
∏I
i=1 Pi,θi and for all i, θi, ai, x:
Pi,θi (a|x) = Pr [αi,θi (sit) = a|xt = x] a.s., where
αi,θi (sit) = arg max
ai∈A
{E [pii,θi (ai, a−it, xt)|xt] + εit (ai) + βE [Vi,θi (st+1)|xt, ait = ai]} ,
Vi,θi (sit) = E[pii,θi (ait, a−it, xt) +
K∑
a′=0
εit (a
′) 1 [ait = a′] |sit] + βE [Vi,θi (sit+1)| sit] .
By construction Pi,θi = Pi for all i when θi = θi0 for all i, and Vi,θi also equals Wi,θi (·;σi)
(as deﬁned in (3.2.3)), when σi =
∏I
j=1 Pj. Let vi,θi (ai, x) = E [pii,θi (ai, a−it, xt)|xt = x] +
βE [Vi,θi (st+1)|xt = x, ait = ai], then we can write
Pi,θi (a|x) = Pr [vi,θi (ai, xt) + εit (ai) > vi,θi (a′i, xt) + εit (a′i) for all a′i 6= ai|xt = x] , (3.2.4)
which is familiar from the classical random utility model (e.g. see McFadden (1974)) with
mean utility vi,θi . The numerical advantage in working with the pseudo-model, as opposed
to the actual model, is that vi,θi is relatively straightforward to compute for diﬀerent θi,
since all expectations that deﬁne vi,θi are calculated independent of θi; all with respect to
P (st+1|st, at) for all players that is equivalent to earlier notation using Eσi when σi =
∏I
j=1 Pj
for all i.
We shall heavily exploit the fact that vi,θi is a linear transformation of pii,θi . To see this,
ﬁrst look at the choice-speciﬁc expected return:
E [Vi,θi (st+1)|xt, ait = ai] = E [E [Vi,θi (st+1)|xt+1]|xt, ait = ai] , and
E [Vi,θi (st)|xt] = E[pii,θi (ait, a−it, xt) +
K∑
a′=0
εit (a
′) 1 [ait = a′] |xt] + βE [E [Vθi (st+1) |xt+1] |xt] .
Let mi,θi = E[Vi,θi (sit) |xt = ·] and gi,θi = E[Vi,θi (sit+1) |xt = ·, ait = ·]. Then, using a
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linear functional notation, we have
gi,θi = Himi,θi ,
mi,θi = ri,θi + ri + Lmi,θi , where for all a, x
ri,θi (x) = E [pii,θi (ait, a−it, xt)|xt = x] ,
ri (x) = E[
K∑
a′=0
εit (a
′) 1 [ait = a′] |xt = x],
Lm (x) = βE [m (xt+1) |xt = x] ,
Him (a, x) = E [m (xt+1) |xt = x, ait = a] ,
where L and Hi are linear maps and ri,θi is a linear transformation of pii,θi . Since (I − L)−1
is also generally a well-deﬁned linear map, as L is a contraction as its norm is strictly less
than 1, then
vi,θi =
(Ri + βHi (I − L)−1R) pii,θi + vi,
where Ri and R are conditional expectation operators, conditioning on xt, integrating over
a−it and at respectively , and vi = βHi (I − L)−1 ri.
The choice probabilities can also be written in terms of diﬀerences in choice speciﬁc ex-
pected payoﬀs. Let ∆vi,θi (ai, x) denote vi,θi (ai, x) − vi,θi (0, x) for ai > 0, then (3.2.4)
becomes
Pi,θi (a|x) = Pr [∆vi,θi (ai, xt) + εit (ai) > ∆vi,θi (a′i, xt) + εit (a′i) for all a′i > 0|xt = x] .
(3.2.5)
SinceA andX are ﬁnite, the relationship between {∆vi,θi (ai, x)}ai>0,x∈X and {pii,θi (a, x)}a∈A,x∈X
can be represented through a matrix equation. We state this representation as a lemma.
Lemma R: Under M1 - M4 {∆vi,θi (ai, x)}ai>0,x∈X can then be represented by a JK−vector,
∆vi,θi :
∆vi,θi = D (Ri + βHiMR) pii,θi + ∆vi, (3.2.6)
where pii,θi is a J (K + 1)
I −vector of {pii,θi (a, x)}a∈A,x∈X so that elements in: Ripii,θi are
{E [pii,θi (ai, a−it, xt)|xt = x]}ai∈A,x∈X ; Rpii,θi are {E [pii,θi (ait, a−it, xt)|xt = x]}x∈X ; M in-
volve
{Pr [xt+1 = x′|xt = x]}; Hi are Pr [xt+1 = x′|xt = x, ait = ai]; and, D is a diﬀerence matrix
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with respect to the expected payoﬀs from playing action 0; and, ∆vi is the diﬀerenced vec-
tor form of the transformation of ri by βiHi (I − L)−1 normalized by action 0. The detailed
constructions of ∆vi,D,Ri,R,Hi and M are provided in the Appendix.
In what follows, we let ∆vi denote ∆vi,θi0 . And, similarly, it shall be convenient to
vectorize the probabilities. In particular, we let Pi,θi and Pi denote the JK−vector that
represent {Pi,θi (ai|x)}ai>0,x∈X and {Pi (ai|x)}ai>0,x∈X respectively.
3.2.4 Estimation
Many objective functions proposed in the literature often can be written directly in terms of
the probabilities from the pseudo-model, such as pseudo-likelihood and GMM, based on the
construction that Pi,θi coincides with Pi when θi = θi0. However, from a numerical perspec-
tive, computing the pseudo-probabilities requires a costly additional step of computation,
namely the integration with respect to the distribution of εit that maps ∆vi,θi into Pi,θi (see
(3.2.5)). These integrals generally do not have closed-form in the expected payoﬀs outside
the well-known exception when private values are i.i.d. extreme value. Even if the integrals
have closed-form, the integration is generally a nonlinear mapping of ∆vi,θi into Pi,θi . In
order to preserve the linear structure outlined previously, we propose to construct objective
functions based directly on ∆vi,θi .
The validity of such objective functions, to identify θ0, follows from the bijective relation
between ∆vi,θi and Pi,θi for each i. This well-known result follows from Proposition 1 of Hotz
and Miller (1993), which we shall refer to as Hotz and Miller's inversion in this paper (also
see Lemma 8 of Matzkin (1991), Lemma 1 of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), and,
for a recent generalization of these results, Norets and Takahashi (2013)).5 In particular, it
immediately follows that for any θi, Pi,θi coincides with Pi if and only if ∆vi,θi coincides
with ∆vi, where ∆vi is identiﬁable from the data by Hotz and Miller's inversion. Then we
can construct a class of estimators based on minimizing the distance between {∆vi,θi}Ii=1
and {∆vi}Ii=1.
Using Lemma R, we can write ∆vi,θi = Xi (θi) + ∆vi, where
Xi (θi) = D (Ri + βHiMR) pii,θi . (3.2.7)
5Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) also show equilibrium condition can be characterized in terms of
expected payoﬀs; see details of their Lemma 1 for further discussions.
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Note that θi enters Xi (θi) through a matrix transform of the vector pii,θi , where the former
does not depend on θi and the latter is completely known and speciﬁed by the researcher.
By Hotz and Miller's inversion, we also have ∆vi = Φi (Pi) for some nonlinear, but known,
function Φi that only depends on the distributional assumption of εit. Then we can deﬁne
a JK−vector, Yi, where
Yi = Φi (Pi)−∆vi. (3.2.8)
Note that Yi is deﬁned independently of θi. So that, by construction:
Yi = Xi (θi) when θi = θi0.
Let Y = (Y>1 , . . . ,Y>I )>, θ = (θ>1 , . . . , θ>I )> and deﬁne a block diagonal matrix X (θ) =
diag(X1 (θ1) ,
. . . ,XI (θI)). In the next section we analyze the asymptotic properties for a class of es-
timators that are motivated from minimizing
S (θ;W) = (Y − X (θ))>W(Y − X (θ)), (3.2.9)
over Θ, for some weighting matrix W .
It is also worth emphasizing that, through {∆vi}Ii=1 , {Ri}Ii=1 ,R,L and {Hi}Ii=1, for any
θ: X (θ) and Y are explicit functions, say TX (θ; γ0) and TY (γ0) respectively, of a ﬁnite-
dimensional vector, γ0, that consists of choice and transition probabilities. However, opti-
mization with S (θ;W) is infeasible since X (θ) and Y are not observed, as γ0 is unknown.
Given a sample from a single equilibrium, {α∗1 (s1t) , . . . , α∗I (sIt) , xt, xt+1}, γ0 can be identi-
ﬁed from the data under weak conditions, hence X (θ) and Y can also be estimated directly
from the data for all θ. Consequently we consider a feasible estimation criterion where X
and Y are replaced by X̂ (θ) = TX (θ; γ̂) and Ŷ = TY (γ̂) respectively, for some preliminary
estimator, γ̂, of γ0. We denote the sample counterpart of S by Ŝ, so that
Ŝ(θ; Ŵ) = (Ŷ − X̂ (θ))>Ŵ(Ŷ − X̂ (θ)), (3.2.10)
where Ŵ can be random and depend on the sample size. We deﬁne our estimator, θ̂(Ŵ), to
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be the minimizer of Ŝ
(
θ; Ŵ
)
:
θ̂(Ŵ) = arg min
θ∈Θ
Ŝ(θ; Ŵ).
Therefore θ̂(Ŵ) is generally a nonlinear least square estimator with generated regressors and
regressands. Note that Ŝ(θ; Ŵ) is easy to evaluate for diﬀerent values of θ, following (3.2.7)
and (3.2.8), X̂i (θ) can be computed by a matrix multiplication of pii,θi by the estimator of
D (Ri + βHiMR), which does not depend on θi, and Ŷi is also independent of θi.
3.3 Main Results
We give large sample properties of our estimator in full generality in Section 3.3.1. We
consider special cases when payoﬀs have linear-in-parameter and partially linear speciﬁca-
tions in 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively. We discuss the relationship between our estimator and
ALSEPSD in Section 3.3.4. In what follows we denote the matrix norm by ‖·‖, so that
‖B‖ = √trace (B>B) for any real matrix B, and we let  p→ and  d→ denote convergence
in probability and distribution respectively.
3.3.1 General Case
From the previous section, we see that TX (θ; ·) and TY (·) are deterministic and smooth
functions in γ for any θ. To analyze the asymptotic properties of θ̂(Ŵ), it will be useful to
keep separate the sampling distribution of the preliminary estimator and the corresponding
generated regressors and regressands. We begin with a preliminary requirement for γ̂.
Assumption P: (i) γ̂
p→ γ0; and, A(ii)
√
N (γ̂ − γ0) d→ N (0,Ξ).
There are several choices for γ̂ in practice that satisfy P under very weak conditions.
The simplest options are perhaps the empirical choice and transition probabilities, otherwise
kernel estimators can be employed (Li and Racine (2006)). We now present our regularity
conditions and main results in terms of (X (θ) ,Y) and their estimators (X̂ (θ) , Ŷ).
Assumption A1: θ0 ∈ int (Θ) where Θ is a compact subset of Rp, and X (θ) = X (θ0) if
and only if θ = θ0.
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Assumption A2: Ŵ p→W, where W is a non-stochastic positive deﬁnite matrix.
Assumption A3: supθ∈Θ ‖X (θ)‖ and ‖Y‖ are ﬁnite, and supθ∈Θ
∥∥∥X̂ (θ)−X (θ)∥∥∥ p→ 0
and Ŷ p→ Y.
Assumption A4: X (θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable at θ0 and ∇X = ∂X (θ)∂θ>
∣∣∣
θ=θ0
has full
column rank.
Assumption A5: supθ∈Bδ(θ0)
∥∥∥∂X̂ (θ)∂θ> − ∂X (θ)∂θ> ∥∥∥ p→ 0, where Bδ (θ0) denotes some neighbor-
hood of θ0.
Deﬁne Û = Ŷ − X̂ (θ0).
Assumption A6:
√
N Û d→ N (0,Σ) for some non-stochastic positive deﬁnite matrix Σ.
Comments on Assumptions A1 - A3.
These conditions are suﬃcient for the consistency of our estimator. A1 - A2 constitute to a
high level identiﬁcation condition as it ensures (3.2.9) has a unique solution at θ0. There has
been little work on more primitive conditions for parametric identiﬁcation of payoﬀ functions
in dynamic games. Most identiﬁcation results in the literature are nonparametric that build
on the work of Magnac and Thesmar (2002); see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)
and Bajari et al. (2009). However, using Hotz and Miller's inversion, it follows that the
condition for identiﬁcation of the pseudo-model at θ0, in the sense that Pi,θi = Pi,θi0 for all
i if and only if θi = θi0 for all i, is precisely the identiﬁcation condition required in A1.
Furthermore, by inspecting Lemma R more closely, for each i, we see that the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the unique parameterization of Xi (θi) at θi0 is for the intersection
between the {pii,θi − pii,θi0 : θi ∈ Θi\ {θi0}} and the null space of D (Ri + βHiMR) to
be empty. Although, without any restriction on pii,θi , A1 generally does not hold since
D (Ri + βHiMR) is always rank-deﬁcient. For a closely related discussion see Srisuma
(2013), who provides constructive conditions for parametric identiﬁcation results in a single
agent model that can be generalized directly to the games considered in this paper. Also see
the identiﬁcation condition and comments of B1 in Section 3.3.2 when linear-in-parameter
restriction is imposed. The uniform boundedness and consistency conditions essentially
depend on {pii,θi}Ii=1. In particular, if D (Ri + βHiMR) is ﬁnite then continuity of {pii,θi}Ii=1
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ensures supθ∈Θ ‖X (θ)‖ is ﬁnite since Θ is compact. Then uniform consistency also follows if
there exists a consistent estimator for D (Ri + βHiMR), which is implied by P(i).
Comments on Assumptions A4 - A6.
For the distribution theory, additional local conditions around θ0 are required. A4 - A5 are
standard smoothness and regularity conditions for an asymptotic normality of an extremum
estimator that optimizes a smooth objective function. Similar to the discussion of suﬃcient
conditions for A3, using Lemma R, a suﬃcient condition for continuous diﬀerentiability of
X (θ) in A4 is continuous diﬀerentiability of pii,θi at θi0 for all i, then A5 will also follow if P(i)
holds. Furthermore, if P(ii) holds, so that the elements in X̂ (θ0) and Ŷ have asymptotically
normal distribution, then by applying a delta-method A6 also holds with Σ = ∇γΞ∇>γ , where
∇γ = ∂∂γ> (TY (γ)− TX (θ0; γ)) |γ=γ0 .
Our estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal under these assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Consistency): Under assumptions A1 - A3, θ̂(Ŵ) p→ θ0.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic Normality): Under assumptions A1 - A6,
√
N
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
)
d→ N (0,ΩW) ,
where ΩW =
(∇>XW∇X )−1∇>XWΣW∇X (∇>XW∇X )−1.
In large sample, the estimators that uniquely solve (3.2.10) are distinguishable up to the
ﬁrst order by ΩW . The eﬃcient estimator in this class can be found by choosing the optimal
weighting matrix,W∗, that minimizes ΩW over the set of all possible positive deﬁnite matrices
(i.e. eﬃciency gain in the spirit of Chamberlain (1982) and Hansen (1982) for instance).
Theorem 3 (Efficient Estimator): Under assumptions A1 - A6, (i) the asymptotic
variance of
√
N
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
)
is bounded below by ΩΣ−1 =
(∇>XΣ−1∇X )−1; and, (ii) if Ŵ p→
Σ−1 then
√
N
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
)
d→ N (0,ΩΣ−1).
The ﬁrst part of Theorem 3 says that the lower variance bound for the class of estimators
we consider is
(∇>XΣ−1∇X )−1. The second part states that any consistent estimator of Σ−1
is suﬃcient to produce an eﬃcient estimator. In practice, consistent estimator for Σ−1 will
52
typically require a preliminary consistent estimator for θ0. The simplest choice is to chooseW
to be an identity matrix, Id. In this case the estimator for θi0 can be computed individually
for each player. We state this in the following corollary.
Corollary A (Identity Weighted Estimator): Under assumptions A1, A3 - A6,√
N
(
θ̂(Id)− θ0
)
d→ N (0,ΩId), where θ̂(Id) =
(
θ̂1(Id)
>, . . . , θ̂I(Id)>
)>
. Furthermore, for
all i: θ̂i(Id) = arg minθi∈Θi(Ŷi − X̂i (θi))>(Ŷi − X̂i (θi)) such that
√
N
(
θ̂i(Id)− θi0
)
d→
N (0, (∇>Xi∇Xi)−1
∇>XiΣi∇Xi
(∇>Xi∇Xi)−1) with ∇Xi = ∂Xi(θ)∂θ>i ∣∣∣θi=θi0 and Σi = limN→∞ V ar(√N(Ŷi − Yi −
(X̂i (θi0)−Xi (θi0))).
3.3.2 Linear-in-Parameter Speciﬁcation
We now consider the leading special case when payoﬀ functions have a linear-in-parameter
speciﬁcation.
Assumption M5 (Linear-in-parameter payoﬀs). For all (i, θi, ai, a−i, x),
pii,θi (ai, a−i, x) = θ
>
i pii (ai, a−i, x) ,
for some p−dimensional vector pii (ai, a−i, x) = (pi1i (ai, a−i, x) , . . . , pipi (ai, a−i, x))>.
We assume M1 - M5 hold throughout this subsection. Then, with a slight abuse of notation,
Xi (θi) in (3.2.7) simpliﬁes to Xiθi, where
Xi = D (Ri + βHiMR) Πi, (3.3.1)
and Πi is a J (K + 1)
I by p matrix of {pii (ai, a−i, x)}ai∈A,x∈X . Let X = diag (X1, . . . ,XI).
The limiting and sample objective functions deﬁned in (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) respectively be-
come
S lip (θ;W) = (Y − X θ)>W(Y − X θ), and
Ŝ lip(θ; Ŵ) = (Ŷ − X̂ θ)>Ŵ(Ŷ − X̂ θ).
If X̂>ŴX̂ is non-singular, then Ŝ lip(θ; Ŵ) is globally convex. The solution to the minization
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problem has a well-known closed-form expression of a weighted least squares estimator,
namely
θ̂lip(Ŵ) =
(
X̂>ŴX̂
)−1
X̂>ŴŶ . (3.3.2)
Although the large sample properties for θ̂lip(Ŵ) follow immediately from Section 3.3.1, they
can be specialized substantially to incorporate M5. Since the results in this subsection may
be most relevant for empirical applications we provide some details here.
Assumption B1: X has full column rank.
Assumption B2: Ŵ p→W, where W is a non-stochastic positive deﬁnite matrix.
Assumption B3: ‖X‖ and ‖Y‖ are ﬁnite, and X̂ p→ X and Ŷ p→ Y .
Deﬁne Û lip = Ŷ − X̂ θ0.
Assumption B4:
√
N Û lip d→ N (0,Σlip) for some non-stochastic positive deﬁnite matrix
Σlip.
Comments on Assumptions B1 - B4.
Similar to A1 - A2, B1 and B2 ensure S lip(θ;W) has a unique solution at θ0. In this case,
the full rank condition of X is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the identiﬁcation of the
pseudo-model (for more details see Srisuma (2013)). The sample counterpart of B1, namely
the rank condition of X̂ , also has a ﬁnite sample signiﬁcance. If Ŵ is positive deﬁnite,
then the full column rank condition of X̂ is necessary and suﬃcient for Ŝ lip(θ; Ŵ) to have a
unique solution, which equals to θ̂lip(Ŵ) as deﬁned in (3.3.2). Assumptions B3 and B4 are
immediate specializations of A3 - A6.
We state the large sample properties for θ̂lip(Ŵ) as corollaries without proofs.
Corollary 1 (Consistency): Under assumptions B1 - B3, θ̂lip(Ŵ) p→ θ0.
Corollary 2 (Asymptotic Normality): Under assumptions B1 - B4,
√
N
(
θ̂lip(Ŵ)− θ0
)
d→ N
(
0,ΩlipW
)
,
where ΩlipW =
(X>WX )−1X>WΣlipWX (X>WX )−1.
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Corollary 3 (Efficient Estimator): Under assumptions B1 -B4, (i) the asymptotic
variance of
√
N
(
θ̂lip(Ŵ)− θ0
)
is bounded below by Ωlip
Σlip−1
=
(
X>Σlip−1X
)−1
; and, (ii) if
Ŵ p→ Σlip−1 then √N
(
θ̂lip(Ŵ)− θ0
)
d→ N
(
0,Ωlip
Σlip−1
)
.
Similarly to the general case, consistent estimator for Σlip
−1
requires a preliminary consis-
tent estimator for θ0. We have the counterpart to Corollary A when we choose W to be an
identity matrix I.
Corollary B (Identity Weighted Estimator): Under assumptions B1, B3 and
B4,
√
N
(
θ̂lip(I)− θ0
)
d→ N
(
0,ΩlipI
)
, where θ̂lip(I) =
(
X̂>X̂
)−1
X̂>Ŷ and
ΩlipI =
(X>X )−1X>ΣX (X>X )−1 . Furthermore, for all i: θ̂lip(I) = (θ̂lip1 (I)>, . . . , θ̂lipI (I)>)>
such that θ̂lipi (I) =
(
X̂>i X̂i
)−1
X̂>i Ŷi and
√
N
(
θ̂lipi (I)− θi0
)
d→ N (0, (X>i Xi)−1X>i Σlipi Xi (X>i Xi)−1)
with Σlipi = limN→∞ V ar(
√
N(Ŷi − Yi − (X̂i −Xi)θi0).
We have shown here that once we have (Ŷ , X̂ ), under some regularity conditions, a con-
sistent estimator for θ0 can be obtained by an OLS estimator, θ̂
lip (I) =
(
X̂>X̂
)−1
X̂>Ŷ
(Corollary B), which can be used to construct an eﬃcient estimator using a familiar a feasi-
ble GLS formulation, θ̂lip
(
Σ̂lip
−1
)
=
(
X̂>Σ̂lip−1X̂
)−1
X̂>Σ̂lip−1Ŷ where Σ̂lip−1 is a consistent
estimator of Σlip
−1
.
Our closed-form estimators also readily accommodate linear restrictions. For instance,
sometimes there are a priori restrictions one may wish to impose on θ0 such as symmetry.
More formally, suppose θ0 is known to satisfy D>θ0 = δ for some known p by q matrix D
that has full row rank q < p and some q−dimensional vector δ. Then a restricted estimator
θ˜lip(Ŵ) that minimizes (3.2.10) subject to D>θ˜lip(Ŵ) = δ, has the following closed-form
expression
θ˜lip(Ŵ) = θ̂lip(Ŵ)−
(
X̂>ŴX̂
)−1
D
(
D>
(
X̂>ŴX̂
)−1
D
)−1 (
D>θ̂lip(Ŵ)− δ
)
,
where θ̂lip(Ŵ) is the unrestricted estimator deﬁned in (3.3.2). The expression above can be
derived using Lagrangean method or through matrix manipulations (see Amemiya (1985,
Section 1.4)). And, since θ˜lip(Ŵ) is an aﬃne transformation of θ̂lip(Ŵ), it is easy to verify
that the optimal weighting matrices for θ˜lip(Ŵ) are the same as those described in Corollary
3, i.e. any Ŵ p→ Σlip−1 .
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3.3.3 Partially Linear Speciﬁcation
One may argue that, in some situations, Assumption M5 is at odds with the spirit of struc-
tural estimation if the functions in the vector pii are interpreted as basis functions. We relax
the linear-in-parameter requirement and instead consider a partially linear structure that
may arise naturally by ways of additive ﬁxed eﬀects, or, frequently in modeling of entry/exit
games, as ﬁxed costs or scrap value. Now suppose θi =
(
θA>i , θ
B>
i
)>
for all i.
Assumption M6 (Partially linear payoﬀs). For all (i, θi, ai, a−i, x),
pii,θi (ai, a−i, x) = θ
A>
i pi
A
i (ai, a−i, x) + pi
B
i,θBi
(ai, a−i, x) ,
for some p−dimensional vector piAi (ai, a−i, x) =
(
piA1i (ai, a−i, x) , . . . , pi
Ap
i (ai, a−i, x)
)>
.
We assume M1 - M4 and M6 hold throughout this subsection. Then it is easy to see that
the RHS of equation (3.2.6) in Lemma R becomes
D (Ri + βHiMR) pi
A
i,θi
+ D (Ri + βHiMR) pi
B
i,θBi
+ ∆vi,
and, we deﬁne, analogously to (3.2.7) and (3.3.1), XAi = D (Ri + βHiMR) ΠAi , and XBi
(
θBi
)
=
D (Ri + βHiMR) pi
B
i,θBi
. Once again, stacking up the vectors from all players, the limiting
and sample objective functions deﬁned in (3.2.9) and (3.2.10) respectively become
Spl (θ;W) = (Y − XAθA −XB (θB))>W(Y − XAθA −XB (θB)), and
Ŝpl(θ; Ŵ) = (Ŷ − X̂AθA − X̂B (θB))>Ŵ(Ŷ − X̂AθA − X̂B (θB)),
where the terms in the above display should by now be familiar. In order to avoid repetition
we only provide a brief discussion of how θ can be (eﬃciently) estimated.
The structural identifying condition in this setting is:
Y = XAθA + XB (θB) if and only if (θA, θB) = (θA0 , θB0 ) .
The additively linear structure allows us to use a Frisch-Waugh-Lovell type argument to
estimate θA0 and θ
B
0 sequentially in two stages. In particular, θ
A
0 and θ
B
0 satisfy the following
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identities:
MWAY =MWAXB
(
θB0
)
, (3.3.3)
where MWA = I − XA
(XA>WXA)−1XA>W is an oblique projection matrix (e.g. see
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993)), so thatMWAXA is a matrix of zeros, and
Y − XB (θB0 ) = XAθA0 . (3.3.4)
An asymptotic least squares estimator that minimizes Ŝpl(θ; Ŵ) can then be constructed
sequentially in two stages. Let
Ŝpl1 (θB; Ŵ) = (MŴAŶ −MŴAX̂
(
θB
)
)>Ŵ(MŴAŶ −MŴAX̂
(
θB
)
),
where MŴA = I − XA(XA>ŴXA)−1XA>Ŵ . In the ﬁrst stage we obtain θ̂plB(Ŵ) =
arg minθB Ŝpl1 (θB; Ŵ). For the second stage, let
Ŝpl2 (θA; Ŵ) = (Ŷ − X̂B(θ̂B)− X̂AθA)>Ŵ(Ŷ − X̂B(θ̂B)− X̂AθA).
Then θ̂plA(Ŵ) = arg minθA Ŝpl2 (θA; Ŵ) = (X̂A>ŴX̂A)−1X̂A>Ŵ(Ŷ − X̂B(θ̂B)). It is easy to
verify the ﬁrst order conditions that θ̂plA(Ŵ) and θ̂plB(Ŵ) individually solve are identical to
the ones obtained from jointly minimizing Ŝpl(θ; Ŵ).
The practical advantage of the sequential approach is purely numerical, in the same spirit
as the well-known partition regression methods described since the work of Frisch and Waugh
(1933). Speciﬁcally, we only need to perform nonlinear optimization routine to search over
a reduced parameter space for θ̂plB(Ŵ) in the ﬁrst stage, as θ̂plA(Ŵ) has a closed-form
expression in terms of θ̂plB(Ŵ). Note also that the optimal weighting matrix for Ŝpl1 and Ŝpl2
is the same, and is identical to the one described in Theorem 3.
3.3.4 An Equivalent ALSE
Generally it is not possible to directly compare asymptotic eﬃciency of diﬀerent estimators
in the literature, although they estimate the same model, since many of the estimators are
deﬁned using non-nesting objective functions. An exception can be found in Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008), who show ALSEPSD includes some estimators of Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) as special cases. Similar to our general
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estimator deﬁned in Section 3.2, the class of ALSEPSD is also indexed by a positive deﬁnite
matrix and optimal weights can be found to deﬁne an eﬃcient estimator (cf. Theorem 3).
As implied by the Proposition E below, our eﬃcient estimator is asymptotically equivalent
to the eﬃcient ALSEPSD. In fact, more is true, the class of estimators we consider and
that of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler are asymptotically equivalent in the sense that one
can choose appropriate weighting matrices so that the two estimators always have the same
asymptotic distribution.
Proposition E. ALSEPSD and our estimator are asymptotically equivalent.
The equivalence follows from the existence of a smooth bijective relation between the choice
probabilities and the normalized expected payoﬀs, i.e. essentially by Hotz and Miller's in-
version and an application of the inverse function theorem. The precise relationship between
the two estimators are summarized by the equations in display (3.5.3) that can be found in
the Appendix.
We end this section with a remark on the relationship between asymptotic least squares
estimators and GMM estimators. ALSEPSD and our estimator are deﬁned using objective
functions that look at the diﬀerences between the data and pseudo-model implied probabili-
ties and payoﬀs respectively at every possible actions and observed states. These diﬀerences
can also be written as moment conditions, thus asymptotic least squares estimators can also
equivalently be deﬁned as GMM estimators (see Chamberlain (1987)). As a consequence, it
follows from Proposition E that the GMM estimators of Hotz and Miller (1993) and Hotz et
al. (1994) are also asymptotically equivalent for a stationary single agent decision model (a
special case of our game when I = 1).6
3.4 Monte Carlo Experiments
We illustrate the performance of our closed-form estimator using the Monte Carlo design in
Section 7 of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008); who also provide further comparison
with other estimators in the literature.
Setup
6The estimator of Hotz et al. (1994) has an additional source of sampling error since they estimate the
discounted expected payoﬀs, E [Vi,θi (st+1)|xt, ait], by forward simulation. However, under suitable con-
ditions, the error from forward simulation does not aﬀect the asymptotic distribution of their estimator.
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Consider a symmetric two-ﬁrm dynamic entry game. In each period t, each ﬁrm i(= 1, 2)
has two possible choices: be active or not active, ait ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 corresponds to not
active and 1 to active . Publically observed state variable has four elements, and can be
represented by the actions made by both ﬁrms in period t − 1, so that xt = (a1t−1, a2t−1).
The vector of states evolves over time according to the transition st+1 = at. Firm 1
′s period
payoﬀs are described as follows:
pi1,θ (a1t, a2t, xt) = 1 [a1t = 1] · [θ1 + θ2a2t]+1 [a1t = 1, a1t−1 = 0] ·F +1 [a1t = 0, a1t−1 = 1] ·W,
where (θ1, θ2, F,W ) denote respectively the monopoly proﬁt, duopoly proﬁt, entry cost and
scrap value that ﬁrm 1 may obtain. Each ﬁrm also receives additive private shocks that are
i.i.d. N (0, 1). The game is symmetric and ﬁrm's 2 payoﬀs are deﬁned analogously.
We set (θ10, θ20, F0,W0) = (1.2,−1.2,−0.2, 0.1). Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008,
p.920) show that there are three distinct equilibria (ﬁve if we permute the identity of the
players as there is one symmetric equilibrium). We generate the data using diﬀerent equilibria
of the game and provide estimates for (θ10, θ20, F0) for each equilibrium. W is taken as
known, since it is not separately identiﬁed (see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2013)). For
each sample size T = 100, 500, 1000, 5000, we report the same statistics as Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (mean and standard deviation of each estimator, and average mean
squared error) from 1000 simulations of four estimators: OLS, GLS, PSD-I and PSD-E,
for each equilibrium. OLS and GLS estimators correspond to our ineﬃcient and eﬃcient
estimators that have closed-form (see Corollary B and Corollary 3 respectively). PSD-I and
PSD-E are the ineﬃcient and eﬃcient versions of ALSEPSD respectively; the former uses
identity weighting matrix. Our Tables 1 - 3 below correspond respectively to equilibria 1 -
3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), thus are directly comparable to their Tables
1 - 3 on p.921-922.
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Table 3.1: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 1)
T Estimator F θ10 θ20 MSE
100 OLS -0.244 (0.328) 1.071 (0.33) -1.087 (0.385) 0.396
GLS -0.210 (0.136) 1.227 (0.276) -1.23 (0.255) 0.161
PSD-I -0.262 (0.316) 1.083 (0.341) -1.094 (0.390) 0.395
PSD-E -0.175 (0.155) 1.292 (0.303) -1.327 (0.301) 0.231
500 OLS -0.213 (0.151) 1.169 (0.141) -1.161 (0.179) 0.077
GLS -0.197 (0.048) 1.213 (0.133) -1.209 (0.096) 0.029
PSD-I -0.220 (0.148) 1.176 (0.144) -1.167 (0.186) 0.079
PSD-E -0.188 (0.047) 1.232 (0.129) -1.223 (0.102) 0.031
1000 OLS -0.206 (0.105) 1.184 (0.09) -1.182 (0.125) 0.035
GLS -0.200 (0.030) 1.200 (0.081) -1.197 (0.062) 0.011
PSD-I -0.209 (0.102) 1.186 (0.090) -1.185 (0.130) 0.036
PSD-E -0.195 (0.029) 1.212 (0.077) -1.204 (0.064) 0.011
5000 OLS -0.204 (0.079) 1.194 (0.061) -1.190 (0.093) 0.019
GLS -0.206 (0.074) 1.196 (0.059) -1.192 (0.089) 0.017
PSD-I -0.201 (0.079) 1.199 (0.064) -1.196 (0.094) 0.019
PSD-E -0.203 (0.077) 1.198 (0.061) -1.195 (0.092) 0.018
Notes: OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that are ineﬃcient and eﬃcient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-
E are asymptotic least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ineﬃcient (identity
weighted) and eﬃcient respectively.
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Table 3.2: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 2)
T Estimator F θ10 θ20 MSE
100 OLS -0.317 (0.472) 0.971 (0.38) -0.891 (0.543) 0.822
GLS -0.428 (0.333) 0.998 (0.328) -0.892 (0.438) 0.598
PSD-I -0.264 (0.495) 1.065 (0.434) -1.006 (0.592) 0.843
PSD-E -0.422 (1.098) 1.073 (0.488) -0.976 (0.588) 1.903
500 OLS -0.221 (0.236) 1.147 (0.192) -1.12 (0.28) 0.181
GLS -0.262 (0.210) 1.153 (0.180) -1.116 (0.261) 0.157
PSD-I -0.201 (0.242) 1.192 (0.205) -1.171 (0.284) 0.182
PSD-E -0.232 (0.214) 1.172 (0.182) -1.154 (0.265) 0.153
1000 OLS -0.216 (0.168) 1.166 (0.135) -1.155 (0.196) 0.088
GLS -0.233 (0.144) 1.171 (0.123) -1.157 (0.180) 0.072
PSD-I -0.205 (0.171) 1.189 (0.142) -1.182 (0.201) 0.090
PSD-E -0.220 (0.150) 1.177 (0.126) -1.173 (0.187) 0.075
5000 OLS -0.205 (0.076) 1.192 (0.058) -1.189 (0.091) 0.018
GLS -0.203 (0.037) 1.196 (0.039) -1.195 (0.05) 0.005
PSD-I -0.202 (0.076) 1.197 (0.061) -1.196 (0.092) 0.018
PSD-E -0.200 (0.043) 1.197 (0.040) -1.201 (0.058) 0.007
Notes: OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that are ineﬃcient and eﬃcient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-
E are asymptotic least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ineﬃcient (identity
weighted) and eﬃcient respectively.
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Table 3.3: Monte Carlo results (Equilibrium 3)
T Estimator F θ10 θ20 MSE
100 OLS -0.304 (0.475) 0.997 (0.398) -0.895 (0.558) 0.840
GLS -0.436 (0.356) 1.015 (0.352) -0.88 (0.446) 0.641
PSD-I -0.241 (0.514) 1.102 (0.471) -1.023 (0.624) 0.917
PSD-E -0.397 (0.445) 1.081 (0.381) -0.975 (0.526) 0.722
500 OLS -0.225 (0.244) 1.149 (0.187) -1.118 (0.282) 0.184
GLS -0.26 0 (0.229) 1.159 (0.185) -1.122 (0.278) 0.175
PSD-I -0.201 (0.258) 1.200 (0.222) -1.176 (0.304) 0.208
PSD-E -0.23 (0.239) 1.177 (0.189) -1.157 (0.287) 0.178
1000 OLS -0.214 (0.177) 1.169 (0.134) -1.158 (0.204) 0.093
GLS -0.227 (0.170) 1.179 (0.136) -1.166 (0.206) 0.092
PSD-I -0.202 (0.180) 1.193 (0.147) -1.187 (0.211) 0.099
PSD-E -0.207 (0.186) 1.191 (0.148) -1.188 (0.220) 0.105
5000 OLS -0.203 (0.082) 1.194 (0.062) -1.19 (0.093) 0.019
GLS -0.205 (0.076) 1.197 (0.060) -1.192 (0.090) 0.017
PSD-I -0.201 (0.083) 1.200 (0.066) -1.196 (0.095) 0.020
PSD-E -0.201 (0.078) 1.199 (0.061) -1.197 (0.094) 0.018
Notes: OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that are ineﬃcient and eﬃcient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-
E are asymptotic least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ineﬃcient (identity
weighted) and eﬃcient respectively.
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The results are as expected from our theory. At smaller sample sizes the estimators are
genuinely diﬀerent regardless of the choice of weight matrices. Since the model is fully para-
metric both eﬃcient estimators generally perform better than the ineﬃcient ones even at
T = 100 across all equilibria. With larger sample sizes the ineﬃcient and eﬃcient estima-
tors seem to have similar properties for both methods. Although, in theory, the ineﬃcient
estimators need not be asymptotically equivalent as both are weighed by the same identity
matrix (see the proof of Proposition E in the Appendix).
Table 3.4: Computation time
M 1 10 20 30 100 200
OLS 0.0021 0.0125 0.0245 0.0366 0.1241 0.2654
(0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
GLS 0.0180 0.1542 0.3091 0.4658 1.8504 5.6084
(0.0038) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0023) (0.0069)
PSD-I 0.2084 4.9957 28.6415 73.3173 1171.5137 5657.6393
(0.0089) (0.0351) (0.1805) (0.0846) (1.9478) (0.9183)
PSD-E 0.3564 10.4140 52.0471 109.5519 1607.2349 7621.5963
(0.0079) (0.0359) (0.1824) (0.1049) (2.6654) (1.2093)
Notes: OLS and GLS are our closed-form estimators that are ineﬃcient and eﬃcient respectively. PSD-I and PSD-
E are asymptotic least squares estimators of Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) that are ineﬃcient (identity
weighted) and eﬃcient respectively.
We now abstract away from the statistical properties and consider the numerical aspects.
To illustrate the potential for computational advantages of our estimator, we introduce an
additive market ﬁxed eﬀect to the per period payoﬀ in the game described above. We use
the number of markets, denoted by M, to control the complexity of the game.7 For each
M, we solve the model once and simulated ﬁve times using the symmetric equilibrium. We
report in Table 4, the average central processing unit (CPU) times in seconds to compute
our estimators and ALSEPSD that minimize their respective limiting objective functions
(no sampling error, using true choice and transition probabilities); standard errors are in
parentheses.8 Our estimators are substantially faster to compute, and the distinction grows
7There are other ways to vary the complexity of the game, e.g. by changing the number of potential actions
and states. However, the diﬃculty to solve and estimate such games increases signiﬁcantly as the games
become more complexed. Our design only requires us to solve a simple game multiple times.
8The simulation was performed using MATLAB (R2012a, 64 bit version), on a standard PC running on an
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exponentially with more parameters in the model. We also expect the computation time for
ALSEPSD to grow at a faster rate with larger action and/or state spaces for any ﬁxed M.
Another, perhaps even more, important numerical property of our closed-form estimators is
they are always global minimizers. In contrast, a numerical solution to a general nonlinear
optimization problem can be sensitive to the search algorithm, initial values, as well as the
nature of the objective function.9
3.5 Conclusions and Possible Extensions
We have shown there can be some non-trivial computational gains in deﬁning estimators
that optimize objective functions constructed in terms of expected payoﬀs instead of choice
probabilities for the estimation of structural dynamic discrete choice problems. The most
transparent advantages of our approach follow from an opportunity to utilize familiar linear
regression techniques, which arise when the period payoﬀ functions are modeled to have
fully or partially linear-in-parameter structure. Since the class of estimators we propose is
asymptotically equivalent to the one developed by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008),
which includes several well-known estimators in the literature, there appears to be no costs
at the theoretical level. Our estimators also perform well in Monte Carlo exercises in terms
of speed and statistical properties.
The computation advantages we describe in this paper accumulates beyond the proce-
dure to obtain a point estimate. For instance, resampling methods that are often used in
practice to obtain standard errors (or perhaps to improve ﬁnite sample properties) clearly
would beneﬁt. The type of objective functions we propose also naturally complements other
research in the literature that aims to improve the performance and/or scope of two-step
methodologies. Two traditional criticisms of two-step estimators are large ﬁnite sample bias
(from the ﬁrst stage nonparametric estimation of choice probabilities), and the inability to
accommodate unobserved heterogeneity and state variables that are persistent over time.
For the former, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002,2007) propose an iteration scheme that can
improve the ﬁnite sample properties by imposing some structure for the ﬁrst stage estima-
Intel Core (TM) 2 Duo 3.16 GHz processor with 4 GB RAM.
9It is easy to construct a game where the (limiting) objective function deﬁned using pseudo-probabilities
has multiple local minima such that some popular built-in optimization package, such as fminunc in
MATLAB, produces diﬀerent minimizers that depend on the initial search value.
64
tors; see Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008,2012) for further discussions and some theoretical
justiﬁcations. At each iteration, the structural estimator can update the choice probabilities
implied by the pseudo-model that are then used to deﬁne a new pseudo-likelihood function.
To incorporate our estimator, alternatively one can use the updated probabilities to con-
struct an objective function that deﬁnes the distance between the (updated) observed and
implied expected payoﬀs. For the latter, the recent nonparametric identiﬁcation results of
Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) and Hu and Shum (2012) show any two-step approach can
also be readily applied to estimate a more general dynamic model than the one considered
in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Under A1 to A3, S (θ;W) has a well-separated minimum at θ0. Let
ψ(θ) = Y − X (θ) and ψ̂(θ) = Ŷ − X̂ (θ). Under A4, it follows that supθ∈Θ ‖ψ(θ)‖ <∞ and
supθ∈Θ
∥∥∥ψ̂(θ)− ψ(θ)∥∥∥ = op (1). Then through some tedious algebra, of repeatedly adding
nulls and using properties of the matrix norm:
Ŝ
(
θ; Ŵ
)
− S (θ;W) = ψ̂(θ)>Ŵψ̂(θ)− ψ(θ)>Wψ(θ)
= 2ψ(θ)>W
(
ψ̂(θ)− ψ(θ)
)
+ op
(∥∥∥ψ̂(θ)− ψ(θ)∥∥∥) ,
where the smaller order terms are uniform over Θ under A2 - A3.
Therefore supθ∈Θ
∣∣∣Ŝ (θ; Ŵ)− S (θ;W)∣∣∣ = op (1), and consistency follows from a standard
argument (e.g. see Newey and McFadden (1994)).
Proof of Theorem 2. Under our assumptions, θ̂(Ŵ) satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
from diﬀerentiating (3.2.10) with respect to θ with probability tending to 1, i.e.
0 =
 ∂X̂ (θ)
∂θ>
∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ̂(Ŵ)
> Ŵ (Ŷ − X̂ (θ̂(Ŵ)))
holds with probability tending to 1. Since Y − X (θ0) = 0, by adding nulls, we have
Ŷ − X̂ (θ̂) = Û + E1 + E2
= Û − ∇X
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
)
+ op
(∥∥∥θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0∥∥∥) ,
where E1 = −
(
X (θ̂(Ŵ))−X (θ0)
)
and E2 = X̂ (θ̂(Ŵ)) − X̂ (θ0) −
(
X (θ̂(Ŵ))−X (θ0)
)
,
and the second equality follows from A5 after applying mean value expansions to the terms
in E1 and E2 around θ0. By adding nulls and using properties of matrix norm, since θ̂(Ŵ) =
θ0+op (1), we also have
∥∥∥∥∥
(
∂X̂ (θ)
∂θ>
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂(Ŵ)
)>
Ŵ − ∇>XW
∥∥∥∥∥ = op (1) under A2 and A5. Therefore
71
θ̂(Ŵ) also satisﬁes
0 = ∇>XW
(
Û − ∇X
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
))
+ op
(
1√
N
+
∥∥∥θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0∥∥∥) ,
with probability tending to 1. Then it follows that
√
N
(
θ̂(Ŵ)− θ0
)
=
(∇>XW∇X )−1∇>XWÛ + op (1) .
An application of Slutsky's theorem gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof for part (i) is standard (e.g. see Theorem 3.2 of
Hansen (1982)). We claim the optimal weighting matrix converges in the limit to Σ−1. Let
B = W∇X
(∇X>W∇X )−1 and C = Σ−1∇X (∇X>Σ−1∇X )−1, so we have ΩW = B>ΣB
and ΩΣ−1 = C
>ΣC. Using simple algebra, it can be shown that B>ΣB − C>ΣC =
(B − C)>Σ (B − C) ≥ 0. For part (ii), it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 that we
did not use any speciﬁc information on Ŵ beyond the fact that it has a positive deﬁnite
probability limit.
Representation Lemma
Proof of Lemma R. First we introduce some additional notations that build on the terms
deﬁned in Section 3.2.2. Let vai,θi =
(
vi,θi (a, x
1) , . . . , vi,θi
(
a, xJ
))
for all a, and vi,θi =(
v0i,θi , . . . , v
K
i,θi
)>
, so that vi,θi is a J (K + 1)−vector.
Let pia1...aIi,θi =
(
pii,θi (a1, . . . , aI , x
1) , . . . , pii,θi
(
a1, . . . , aI , x
J
))
for all a1, . . . , aI , and pii,θi =(
pi0...0i,θi , . . . , pi
K...K
i,θi
)>
, so that pii,θi is a J (K + 1)
I −vector. For any k let: Id denote an iden-
tity matrix of size d; Hi denote a block-diagonal matrix diag
(
H0i , H
1
i , . . . , H
K
i
)
, where
Hai denotes a J × J matrix such that (Hai )jj′ = Pr
[
xt+1 = x
j′|xt = xj, ait = a
]
; M =(
I(K+1)I ⊗M
)
where M = (IJ − L)−1 and L denotes a J × J matrix such that (L)jj′ =
β Pr
[
xt+1 = x
j′|xt = xj
]
; R =

P 0...0 · · · PK...K
... · · · ...
P 0...0 · · · PK...K
 be a J (K + 1)I by J (K + 1)I ma-
trix, where P a1...aI = diag(P (a1, . . . , aI |x1) ,
. . . , P
(
a1, . . . , aI |xJ
)
) with P (a1, . . . , aI |x) = Pr[α1,θ1 (sit) = a1, . . . , αI,θI (sIt) = aI |xt =
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x] =
∏I
j=1 Pj (aj|x), and let Ri =

P 0...0i0 · · · PK...Ki0
... · · · ...
P 0...0iK · · · PK...KiK
 be a J (K + 1) by J (K + 1)I ma-
trix, where P a1...aIik = diag(Pik (a1, . . . , aI |x1) , . . . , Pik
(
a1, . . . , aI |xJ
)
) with Pik (a1, . . . , aI |x) =
Pr[α1,θ1 (sit) = a1, . . . , αi−1,θi−1 (si−1t) = ai−1, αi,θi (sit) = k, αi+1,θi+1 (si+1t) = ai+1, αI,θI (sIt) =
aI |xt = x] = Pi (k|x)
∏I
j 6=i Pj (aj|x).
Deﬁne ∆vai,θi =
(
vi,θi (a, x
1)− vi,θi (0, x1) , . . . , vi,θi
(
a, xJ
)− vi,θi (0, xJ)) for all a > 0, and
∆vθ =
(
∆v1i,θi , . . . ,∆v
K
i,θi
)>
. Let D denote the JKI × J (K + 1)J matrix that performs the
transformation Dvθ = ∆vθ. Lastly, let v
a
i =
(
vi (a, x
1) , . . . , vi
(
a, xJ
))
for all a, and deﬁne
vi =
(
v0i , . . . , v
K
i
)>
, so that ∆vi = Dvi is a J (K + 1)−vector. Then (3.2.6) immediately
follows.
Asymptotic Equivalence of ALSEs
Proof of Proposition E. In the proof of this proposition we shall assume standard
regularity conditions hold throughout (i.e. we assume inverse of matrices exist, expected
payoﬀs and functions are bounded and continuously diﬀerentiable etc.). As seen from the
proof of Theorem 2, under standard regularity conditions θ̂(Ŵ) satisﬁes
θ̂(Ŵ) = θ0 +
(∇>XW∇X )−1∇>XWÛ + op( 1√
N
)
. (3.5.1)
Next we introduce ALSEPSD. It shall be useful to bear in mind the illustrative discussion
in Section 3.2.1. We ﬁrst deﬁne some additional notations that build on the terms deﬁned
in Section 3.2.3. Let P =
(
P>1 , . . . ,P
>
I
)>
and Pθ =
(
P>1,θ1 , . . . ,P
>
I,θI
)>
. Similarly, let ∆v =(
∆v>1 , . . . ,∆v
>
I
)>
and ∆vθ =
(
∆v>1,θ1 , . . . ,∆v
>
I,θI
)>
. Then, by Hotz and Miller's inversion
there exists an invertible and continuously diﬀerentiable map Γ such that P = Γ (∆v) and
Pθ = Γ (∆vθ). In particular
P =
(
Γ1 (∆v1)
> , . . . ,ΓI (∆vI)
>
)>
, and
Pθ =
(
Γ1 (∆v1,θ1)
> , . . . ,ΓI (∆vI,θI )
>
)>
,
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where Γi is the inverse of Φi, which is deﬁned in the text. Therefore, in terms of Y and X (θ),
∆v −∆vθ = Y − X (θ) .
Thus P and Pθ are also deterministic functions of the preliminary estimators (that we
denoted by γ0). We denote the estimators of P and Pθ by P˜ and P̂θ respectively, and these
estimators are constructed based on the same γ̂ that deﬁne X̂ and Ŷ . Note that, although
P = Pθ0 , P˜ and P̂θ0 are generally diﬀerent. An ALSEPSD, denoted by θ̂PSD(V̂), is deﬁned
as the minimizer of
min
θ∈Θ
(
P˜− P̂θ
)>
V̂
(
P˜− P̂θ
)
,
for some V̂ that converges in probability to positive deﬁnite matrix V (cf. equation (21)
on page 915 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). Under appropriate regularity
conditions, it is straightforward to show, analogous to our Theorem 2, that
√
N
(
θ̂PSD(V̂)− θ0
)
d→ N (0,ΨV) .
For a ﬁrst order asymptotic equivalence, it suﬃces to only consider the local asymptotic
properties of ALSEPSD around θ0. Let ∇P denote ∂Pθ∂θ>
∣∣
θ=θ0
. An ALSEPSD satisﬁes
0 = −∇>PV
(
P˜−P−
(
P̂θ̂PSD(V) −Pθ0
))
+ op
(
1√
N
)
.
As the problem is smooth, it can be shown generally that the condition above simpliﬁes
further to
0 = −∇>PV
(
P˜−P−
(
P̂θ0 −Pθ0 + Pθ̂PSD(V) −Pθ0
))
+ op
(
1√
N
)
.
So that we have
θ̂PSD (V) = θ0 +
(∇>PV∇P)−1∇>PV (P˜−P− (P̂θ0 −Pθ0))+ op( 1√
N
)
.
By chain rule ∇P equals ∇Γ∇X , where ∇Γ denotes the Jacobian of Γ evaluated at ∆v, and
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∂∆vθ
∂θ>
∣∣
θ=θ0
equals ∇X . Thus, we can write
θ̂PSD (V) = θ0 +
(∇>X∇>ΓV∇Γ∇X )−1∇>X∇>ΓV (P˜−P− (P̂θ0 −Pθ0))+ op( 1√
N
)
= θ0 +
(∇>X∇>ΓV∇Γ∇X )−1∇>X∇>ΓV∇ΓÛ + op( 1√
N
)
,
where the last equality follows from linearizing P˜−P− (P̂θ0 −Pθ0) in terms of Ŷ − X̂ (θ0).
By deﬁning WV = ∇>ΓV∇Γ, we have
θ̂PSD (V) = θ0 +
(∇>XWV∇X )−1∇>XWV Û + op( 1√
N
)
. (3.5.2)
Therefore, by comparing (3.5.1) and (3.5.2), θ̂PSD (V) has the same asymptotic distribution
as θ̂ (WV). In particular, let V∗ denote the eﬃcient weighting matrix for ALSEPSD so that
ΨV∗ ≤ ΨV for any positive deﬁnite matrix V . Therefore the eﬃcient ALSEPSD, denoted by
θ̂∗PSD, has the same asymptotic distribution as θ̂ (WV∗) with WV∗ = ∇>ΓV∗∇Γ. Then it must
hold, by Theorem 3(i), that ΩΣ−1 ≤ ΨV∗ since ΩΣ−1 is the lower variance bound. To complete
the proof, an identical argument can be made in the reverse direction. It is easy to show
that any θ̂ (W) that satisﬁes (3.5.1) also has the same asymptotic distribution as θ̂PSD (VW),
where VW = ∇>Γ−1W∇Γ−1 (cf. WV), and ∇Γ−1 denotes the Jacobian of Γ−1 evaluated at
P (that equals (∇Γ)−1 by the inverse function theorem). We omit further details to avoid
repetition. Thus, it follows that ΨV∗ ≤ ΩΣ−1 , hence we can also conclude that ΨV∗ = ΩΣ−1 .
In summary:
√
N
(
θ̂(W)− θ0
)
=
√
N
(
θ̂PSD(VW)− θ0
)
+ op
(
1√
N
)
with VW = ∇>Γ−1W∇Γ−1 ,(3.5.3)
√
N
(
θ̂PSD(V)− θ0
)
=
√
N
(
θ̂(WV)− θ0
)
+ op
(
1√
N
)
with WV = ∇>ΓV∇Γ,
and (V ,W) can be replaced by any consistent estimators (V̂ , Ŵ). Therefore our estimator
and ALSEPSD can always be constructed to have the same asymptotic distribution and
achieve the same lower variance bound.
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Chapter 4
Bank Privatization and the Supply of
Banking Services: Evidence from a
Dynamic Structural Model
Co-authored with Fabio A. Miessi Sanches (University of São Paulo)
Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀects of bank privatization on the supply of banking services in
small markets. A dynamic game between the major Brazilian public and private banks is
estimated. We show that proﬁts of private banks are positively aﬀected by the number of
public and negatively aﬀected by the number of private branches operating in Brazilian small
markets. The structural model is used to examine the eﬀects of the privatization of public
banks on the number of bank branches in small markets. The counterfactual shows that the
number of branches operating in small markets drops signiﬁcantly after the privatization.
4.1 Introduction
The discussion about the existence of public, state owned banks has been prominent in the
banking literature since the 1960's - see Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) and La Porta,
López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2007).
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In favour of public banks the following has been argued: (i) Public banks ﬁnance un-
proﬁtable but socially valuable investment projects; (ii) they foster ﬁnancial development
and (iii) they provide ﬁnancial access to populations living in areas that are unattractive
for private institutions. Critics of public banks argue that (i) they are used as political
instruments, providing employment, credit, subsidies or other beneﬁts in return for political
assistance, and (ii) they crowd-out more eﬃcient, more competitive private banks, slowing
down the development of the ﬁnancial system.
This paper examines the eﬀects of public banks privatization on the supply of banking
services. A dynamic entry game between the major Brazilian public and private banks is
estimated. A counterfactual experiment is used to analyze how the privatization of public
banks aﬀects the supply of banking services in small isolated markets.
Three main conclusions emerge. First, public banks generate positive proﬁt spill-overs for
private banks; second, private banks crowd-out private competitors. Our estimates show
that the entry of a public bank in a given market increases the return of a private incumbent
by 1.2 percent and the entry of a private bank reduces the return of a private incumbent
by 0.05 to 1 percent. Third, the counterfactual in which public banks are sold to private
players shows that the total number of active branches operating in the long-run in a typical
small market drops from 3 to 0.5 on average. To guarantee that, after privatization, all small
municipalities would have at least one active branch the government should give a subsidy
of approximately 8% on the operational costs of private branches. We can infer that the
present cost of this policy would be approximately US$175,0001 per market.
These ﬁndings have important policy implications in developing countries. In these coun-
tries a large fraction of the population has no access to the banking market. Yet the access
to ﬁnancial services generates positive eﬀects in terms of poverty reduction and economic
growth in disadvantaged areas (Burgess and Pande (2005) and Pascali (2012)).
Our estimates do not allow us to disentangle the details of the spill-over channels. Broadly
speaking, our ﬁndings are consistent with public banks (i) having a monopoly over a number
of important Federal funds and (ii) being driven by social, as opposed to strategic or market
reasons. The ﬁrst element guarantees a large volume of credit for small markets - see Feler
(2012). The second induces product diﬀerentiation between public and private banks: Public
and private banks target diﬀerent clients - see Coelho, Melo and Rezende (2012). In this
1Approximately R$350,000.%
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case, the amount of cheap credit and public transfers poured in by the public banks in small
isolated municipalities shifts the demand for banking services, making these markets more
attractive for private players. This eﬀect induces the entry of private players.
There is little prior empirical evidence of the eﬀects of public banks on the performance of
the banking market. The evidence is mixed. La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002)
study a cross section of countries and show that the presence of public banks in the market
is associated with poorly developed ﬁnancial markets. They conclude that the higher the
public ownership in the banking sector, the lower is the average growth of the ratio of private
credit to GDP. Similar ﬁndings were obtained in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) who ﬁnd
that greater state ownership of banks with more poorly developed banks, nonbanks, and
securities markets.
Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2007) extend the dataset used in La Porta, López-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2002) by including more controls and a longer period of time. They
ﬁnd that no robust conclusion can be drawn. The ﬁndings depend strongly on the deﬁnition
of ﬁnancial development, the estimator and the sample deﬁnition. They conclude that there
is (...) no signiﬁcant correlation between state-ownership of banks and credit to the private
sector 2. Detragiache, Tessel and Gupta (2008) conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Levy Yeyati, Micco
and Panizza (2007).
Cole (2007) ﬁnds that the nationalization of public banks in India increased the amount
of credit in the market. Feler (2012) analyses the privatization of state banks in Brazil. His
ﬁndings are close to the ﬁndings in Cole (2007).
This paper builds a dynamic entry game in which the major Brazilian public and private
banks are the players. The dynamic structure of the model is rationalized by the existence of
substantial entry costs in the market. At each period these players have information about
the state variables and decide simultaneously to be active or not active in a given market
by maximizing an inter-temporal proﬁt function. Entrants pay a entry cost. We assume
that the proﬁt function of the major private players is asymmetrically aﬀected by public and
private competitors.
We use data from 1002 isolated markets in Brazil during 1988-2010 to estimate the decision
rules for public and private banks. By relying on micro data from a single market, we are able
to reduce the market heterogeneity present in cross country regressions, which, as reported
2Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2007).
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by Levy Yeyati, Micco and Panizza (2007), causes important bias in the conclusions obtained
by the existing literature. We recover the primitives of the game that are consistent with
the estimated decision rules. The model is solved for the entry probabilities. The market
equilibrium is evaluated under the counterfactual scenario where public banks are privatized.
We report consistent ex ante estimates of the eﬀects of this policy on market outcomes. Our
model is valuable to predict policy changes.
Methodologically our paper is related to the empirical industrial organization literature
that studies the estimation of dynamic games - see Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010), Bajari,
Hong and Nekipelov (2010) and Pesendorfer (2010) for a rich discussion on the topic. Ap-
plications that are similar to ours are also found in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)
for small businesses in Austria, Dunne, Klimek, Roberts and Xu (2013) for dentists and
chiropractors in the US, Gowrisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler and Town (2010) for
hospitals in the US, Collard-Wexler (2013) for the concrete industry in the US, Ryan (2012)
for the cement industry in the US and Kalouptsidi (2013) for the shipping industry. Other
applications include Maican and Orth (2012), Minamihashi (2012), Lin (2011), Fan and
Xiao (2012), Nishiwaki (2010), Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins, and Ellickson (2012), Jeziorski
(2012), Snider (2009), Suzuki (2012), Sweeting (2011) and Beresteanu, Ellickson and Misra
(2010).
To estimate the model we use the alternative Asymptotic Least Squares (ALS) estimator
developed in Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2013). Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2013) show that
there can be substantial computational gains when the ALS estimator developed in Pesendor-
fer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) is speciﬁed in terms of expected payoﬀs instead of choice
probabilities. They also show that under the assumption of linear-in-the-parameters payoﬀs,
the proposed estimator have the familiar OLS expression3. Diﬀerently from other popular
estimation procedures for dynamic games (e.g. Hotz and Miller (1993), Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008),
among others) this approach allows us to avoid the use of numerical methods. In doing so
the computational burden is greatly reduced.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our dataset and the Brazil-
ian banking market. Section 4.3 shows reduced form evidence of competition between pub-
3Besides, Monte Carlo simulations in Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2013) show that the closed-form estimator
is much faster and have better small sample properties than the Asymptotic Least Squares estimator
developed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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lic/private players. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 describe the theoretical model, the empirical model
and our main results. Section 6 discusses the ﬁtting of the empirical model and our coun-
terfactual analysis. The last section concludes the paper.
4.2 Data and Institutional Background
The data comes from the Brazilian Central Bank and from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour.
The Brazilian Central Bank database has followed the activities of all Brazilian banks since
1900. These data contain the opening and closing dates4 and the name of the chain that
operates each branch for all branches opened since 1900 in all Brazilian municipalities. A
measure of market size is constructed by using data from the Brazilian Ministry of Labour
containing the total payroll in the formal sector 5 for all Brazilian cities since 1985. The
payroll data is deﬂated using the oﬃcial inﬂation index, IPCA-IBGE. All the values are in
R$ of 2011. The information about banking and economic activity is annual.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) our analysis examines small isolated markets. We
select municipalities6 that are at least 20 km away from the nearest municipality. State
capitals and metropolitan areas are excluded. We also excluded municipalities that had
more than 10 bank branches since 1900. This selection leaves us with 1002 isolated small
markets, corresponding, roughly, to 20% of all Brazilian municipalites. Isolated markets
enable us to obtain a clear measure of the potential demand for each branch.
The market size data starts in 1985. We exclude 1986 and 1987 from our sample because
a major macroeconomic shock caused by two heterodox stabilization plans 7 severely dis-
organized the Brazilian economy in those years. Our ﬁnal sample consists of observations
for 1002 isolated municipalities in the period 1988-2010. The vast majority of municipalities
have either one or none branch per chain. Our initial focus of analysis is therefore on entry
and exit patterns. 8
 Sample statistics. The next table illustrates the basic statistics of our sample.
4For the branches that were closed.
5Number and wage of employees in the formal sector of the economy.
6From now on we use municipality/market interchangeably.
7Cruzado Plan in 1986 and Bresser Plan in 1987.
8In the municipalities that had more than one branch operated by the same chain, which correspond to less
than 4% of the total number of municipalities and around 0.2% of our sample, we aggregated the branch
level information for each player that had more than one branch in the same market. The exclusion of
these municipalities does not change our results. Therefore we kept this information in the dataset.
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Table 4.1: Basic Sample Statistics 1988-2010
Average Std
Active Branches (**) 1560.2 142.4
Entry (**) 50.5 49.1
Exit (**) 59.5 55.1
Sample Market Size (*) (**) 10,404.85
Municipalities 1002
Sample Municipalities/Total Number of Municipalities 18%
Municipalities × Periods 22041
Note: * R$ millions of 2011. ** Yearly averages.
Our sample is composed by 1002 isolated markets. This corresponds to approximately 18%
of the total number of municipalities in Brazil. The number of branches in this sample is
1560 per year on average. Entry is observed 50 times per year and exit 59 times. The yearly
market size measured by the annual payroll of the formal workers of all the municipalities in
the sample is of R$ 10.4 billions of 2011. This value is relatively small because by excluding
state capitals and metropolitan regions, the richest cities in the country are left aside.
The Brazilian banking market is dominated by four big institutions: Two of them, Bank
of Brazil, BB, and Caixa Economica Federal, CEF, are public and controlled by the federal
government while the other two, Bradesco and Itau, are privately held. The next ﬁgures
show the number of branches that are controled by these institutions and the market share,
measured in terms of the number of active branches in the sample, of these four players.
Figure 4.1: Number of Branches (left) and Market Share (right) - Big Four
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Note: Number of active branches per year (left) and fraction (right) of these branches over the total number of
active branches in our sample.
These four players hold more than 80% of the active branches in our sample. The share of
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Bradesco and Itau increased substantially over time. From 2000 to 2010 Bradesco's market
share measured in terms of active branches increased from 13% to 20%. Itau's share increased
from 1% to 10%. Part of the expansion is explainable by the acquisitions of privatized
smaller public institutions. Bank of Brazil, BB, also experienced an increase in the number
of branches. This expansion is mainly driven by the social policy of Lula's government
(2003-2010), which tried to expand the presence of public banks in small markets.
Table 4.2: Average Monthly Payroll and Number of Public/Private Players
Number of Private Number of Public Mun Payroll Observations
0 0 0.227 4592
0 1 0.478 6496
0 2 0.680 2511
1 0 0.515 1555
1 1 1.333 1696
1 2 1.677 1107
2 0 1.034 149
2 1 2.419 552
2 2 2.202 380
Note: Average market size is the monthly average payroll of the municipal-
ity and is measured in R$ millions of jan/2011 according to the number of
players in the market. Sample period: 1988-2010. Each observation cor-
responds to a municipality in a given year. We showed in the table only
the most frequent market structures. This corresponds to around 90% of
the total number of observations.
Table 4.2 reports (i) the frequency distribution of each market conﬁguration (number
of observations corresponding to each market structure) and (ii) the average market size
(monthly average payroll of the municipality in R$ millions of 2011) corresponding to each
market structure. These numbers illustrate that:
1. Public players are located more frequently in small markets (as measured by the mu-
nicipality average payroll) than private players; and,
2. Public players are frequently the only providers of ﬁnancial services in these isolated
markets (the frequency of public monopolies - 6496 observations - is the highest in the
sample).
The Brazilian government has launched some programs that aim to popularize basic ﬁnan-
cial services in poorer areas, which includes the supply of basic services (current account, for
example) and of credit lines to small farmers and ﬁrms. This feature may explain the fact
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that the frequency of markets where the public player is a monopolist (the only provider of
ﬁnancial services) is quite high in our sample. In addition, the empirical evidence indicates
that public banks are much less productive than their private counterparts (Nakane and
Weintraub (2005)). This means that the presence of public banks in smaller markets is not
explained by cost advantages of public players.
 Institutional background. The Brazilian banking market is large. In 2012 Itau was
considered the 8th largest bank in the world in terms of market value (with a market value
of US$88 billions); Bradesco was the 17th largest (market value of US$64 billions) and Bank
of Brazil was the 31st largest (market value of US$42 billions)9.
As pointed out in Coelho, Melo and Rezende (2012) there are important diﬀerences in the
objectives of public and private banks. Private banks are essentially proﬁt oriented. By legal
mandate, public banks focus their operations on market segments that are not proﬁtable for
private banks. This suggests the existence of product diﬀerentiation in the market. In what
follows we describe the social role of public banks in Brazil10.
Bank of Brazil (BB) has expanded enormously its operations in smaller and poorer areas
of the country based on central government policies aiming to popularize banking services
among poor workers and small businesses. BB plays an important role as the provider of
government funds to the Brazilian agriculture11. Also, to expand its capillarity in isolated
areas, BB created a DSR (Regional Development Program). The DSR provides a set of tools
for small entrepreneurs, including a business plan, technical support and credit 12.
Caixa Economica Federal (CEF) has a monopoly over a number of diﬀerent government
funds and services, such as the FGTS, Bolsa Família, PIS13 and the Federal Lottery14. FGTS
is a Brazilian fund created in 1966 to provide assistance to unemployed people 15 . These
9http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/market-cap. Access: November 12, 2012.
10also present a detailed discussion on the role of Brazilian public banks.
11The total amount of agricultural credit provided by this player in 2010 reached more than US$ 26 billions.
Moreover, BB is the main bank in the Pronaf, a program created to supply credit for small businesses
(agriculture, ﬁshing, turism, and handcraft) in rural areas at a very low interest rate. The total credit
availble for the program increased from US$ 1 billion in 1999 to US$ 7 billions in 2010. All banks in
Brazil are allowed to take part in the program, however, BB distributes around 65% of the total Pronaf
credit.
12In 2007 the program supported 2800 business plans and distributed US$ 1.7 billions in credit.
13PIS is a tax to cover unemployment beneﬁts. Their assets were around US$14 billions in December 2010.
14The Federal Lottery provided a gross revenue of US$5.2 billions in 2010. It is used to fund sports.
15The main source of funding is the monthly compulsory deposit that every private employer must do in
the name of each employee. These values constitutes a fund and the worker have access to the money
deposited in his/her name only in some special conditions: Unemployment, chronic disease, and for
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resources are allocated in two main areas: Housing and sanitation. The government gives
the investments guidelines in order to ﬁnance strategic areas with lack of credit. CEF is also
responsible for the distribution of the beneﬁts from Bolsa Família16, a program that gives to
poor families a monthly income. It was created to reduce the poverty in the most backward
areas of the country.
Summarizing, the descriptive analysis suggests that the major Brazilian public banks have
been used by the federal government to improve the ﬁnancial access of isolated markets. The
ﬁnancial access includes new branches in smaller and poorer markets and the injection of
cheap credit in these areas. These operations are not proﬁtable for private banks. This
suggests the existence of product diﬀerentiation in the market.
4.3 Reduced Form Analysis
We estimate a series of reduced form logit models to explain entry/exit movements of the
biggest public and private players using the sample of isolated municipalities. We focus on
the behavior of the 4 largest players: Bank of Brazil (BB), Caixa Economica Federal (CEF),
Bradesco and Itau.
Two pooled logit models are estimated: One for the public players, BB and CEF; the
other for private players, Itau and Bradesco. Our logit speciﬁcation is:
P (aimt = 1|aimt−1, npubmt−1, nprimt−1,xmt; ρ, µ) =
Λ(ρ0 + ρ1aimt−1 + ρ2n
pub
mt−1 + ρ3n
pri
mt−1 + ρ4xmt + µt + µm + µmt + µi) (4.3.1)
The dependent variable, aimt, is the action of player i in municipality m, period t. It
assumes 1 if player i was active in that municipality/period and zero otherwise. aimt−1
indicates the action of the same player in that municipality in the prior period. npubmt−1 is the
buying a house (if the worker does not own another house). CEF is responsible for the whole operation
of the fund - from the tax collection to the payments for the beneﬁted workers. Since the FGTS universe
includes all formal workes (except public servants) the total size of the fund is considerably high - around
US$90 billions in December 2008.
16In 2006 the program served around 11 million families or approximately 44 thousand individuals. The
public expenditure with the program is around 0.5% of the Brazilian GDP and is growing steadily since
its creation.
85
number of public competitors in the previous period in market m17; nprimt−1 is the number of
private competitors in the previous period in market m18; xmt is a vector of municipality
characteristics; µt are time eﬀects; µm are market speciﬁc eﬀects; µmt captures market/time
speciﬁc eﬀects and µi are player speciﬁc eﬀects. Λ (·) is the logistic distribution. The greek
letters denote parameters to be estimated. The data include all muncipalities where player
i was active for at least one period 19.
The estimation of dynamic binary response models with market ﬁxed eﬀects produces
biased coeﬃcients - see Carro (2007), Wooldridge (2010). To avoid this bias in our analysis,
instead of including market dummies, 27 state dummies (one for each Brazilian state) were
included in the model. States dummies are used to capture time invariant heterogeneity
across municipalities of diﬀerent states. Time eﬀects are captured by year dummies. Time
varying market eﬀects are captured by the interaction of state dummies and a trend variable.
The vector xmt includes municipality payroll, transfers of the Federal and State govern-
ments to the municipality, municipal government expenditure and agricutural production of
the municipality. Municipality payroll is a measure of market size. The inclusion of transfers
and municipal expenditure controls for the fact that entry of public banks can be correlated
with an increase of Federal/State investment in the municipality, which can also aﬀect entry
of private banks. Agricultural production is included because a large fraction of the income
in our isolated municipalities comes from agricultural activities. This variable is a diﬀerent
indicator of market size.
4.3.1 Private players
Table 4.3 reports the estimates of equation (4.3.1) for the private players, Bradesco and
Itau. Only the marginal eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 evaluated at the sample means are
reported. The model ﬁt is good, with Pseudo-R2 of 87%-91%. Strikingly, the number of
public banks increases the entry probabilities of the private players by 10%-14%. The eﬀects
17Mathematically, npubmt−1 =
∑
j∈ipub,j 6=i
ajmt, where ipub is the set of public players.
18Mathematically, nprimt−1 =
∑
j∈ipri,j 6=i
ajmt, where ipri is the set of private players.
19Our estimation approach is based on the potential markets for each player. The potential market is deﬁned
based on the super eﬃcient estimator described in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003). We deﬁned
that market m is a potential market for player i if max
t
{aimt, t = 1900, 1901, .., 2010} = 1, or, in other
words, market m is a potential market for player i if she entered in that market at least for one period
since 1900.
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are very signiﬁcant and robust across speciﬁcations. The inclusion of state dummies and the
interaction between state dummies and the time trend increases this eﬀect.
Interestingly, the number of private competitors reduces the entry probabilities of private
players. This eﬀect is around -6.4% in the speciﬁcation with the full set of controls. It is
statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table 4.3: Marginal Eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 on the Entry Probabilities of Private Players,
Bradesco and Itau
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Nº Public 0.10544*** 0.12839*** 0.13829*** 0.13237***
[0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Nº Private -0.03532 -0.01930 -0.06206** -0.06409**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Player Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Trend*State Dummies No No Yes Yes
Transfers, Expenditure, Agric. Prod. No No No Yes
Observations 15,919 15,229 15,229 15,217
Pseudo R2 0.87 0.87 0.91 0.91
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant at 10%. Marginal eﬀects calculated at the
sample means. Clustered standard errors in brackets. All the models have lagged activity, number of public
and private competitors and municipality payroll. Transfers correspond to the total transfers of Federal
and State governments to the municipality. Expenditure corresponds to municipal government expenditure.
Agricultural Production is the total agricultural production of each municipality.
As a robustness check, the model was estimated in a subsample of municipalities that had
(i) at least one public player and (ii) at least one and at most three public players in any
time period. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 in the appendix report the results for each subsample.
The pattern of results remains unchanged when compared to the estimates in Table 4.3.
This strategy is used to control for unobservable characteristics of markets with and without
public players. In the subsample with at least one and at most three public players the
market heterogeneity is reduced. Markets with roughly the same number of public players
have similar observable characteristics.
4.3.2 Public players
Table 4.4 reports the estimates of equation (4.3.1) for the public players, Bank of Brasil
and Caixa Economica Federal. The model ﬁt is good, with Pseudo-R2 statistics around
87
85%. Strikingly, entry probabilities of public players are barely aﬀected by the number
of public and the number of private competitors in each market. Although signiﬁcant in
some speciﬁcations the marginal eﬀects of the number of public and the number of private
competitors are very small when contrasted with the estimates in Table 4.3. In all the
speciﬁcations the marginal eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 are small in magnitude, being below
1% and 0.5% respectively. In speciﬁcation (IV) in Table 4.3 these eﬀects were respectively
13% and -6.4%. These estimates imply that the marginal eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 are
around 13 times larger for private banks than for public banks. This pattern is robust to the
inclusion of state dummies, the interaction of state dummies and the time trend variable,
public transfers, municipal expenditure and agricultural production.
Table 4.4: Marginal Eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 on the Entry Probabilities of Public Players,
BB and CEF
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Nº Public 0.00498*** 0.00871*** 0.00934*** 0.00936***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Nº Private 0.00016 0.00105 0.00455** 0.00455**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Player Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Trend*State Dummies No No Yes Yes
Transfers, Expenditure, Agric. Prod. No No No Yes
Observations 20,357 20,357 20,357 20,350
Pseudo R2 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.87
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant at 10%. Marginal eﬀects calculated
at the sample means. Clustered standard errors by municipality in brackets. All the models have lagged
activity, number of public and private competitors and municipality payroll. Transfers correspond to the
total transfers of Federal and State governments to the municipality. Expenditure corresponds to municipal
government expenditure. Agricultural Production is the total agricultural production of each municipality.
4.4 Theoretical Model
This section sets up and solves a dynamic entry game between the major Brazilian banks.
Motivated by the data, the game considers entry and exit decisions. In the data a chain has
typically at most one branch in each municipality20. We focus on the behavior of two public
20As described above only in 4% of these municipalities one chain had more than 1 branch during the same
period.
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banks, Bank of Brazil and Caixa Economica Federal, and two private banks, Bradesco and
Itau. In 2010, these players had more than 80% of the total number of active branches in
our sample.
The model captures the features documented by the reduced forms. Dynamics can be
rationalized by high entry costs21. Importantly, the model allows for diﬀerent behavior of
public and private players.
We estimate the primitives that rationalize the behavior of private banks using a dynamic
oligopoly game. We do not structurally model the behavior of public banks. Entry decisions
of public banks are assumed to do not depend on the number of public and the number
of private competitors in the market. There are two explanations behind this assumption.
First, the reduced form analysis suggests that entry probabilities of public banks are barely
aﬀected by the number of public and the number of private competitors in the market.
Second, the literature recognizes that public banks are not necessarily proﬁt maximizers.
The behavior of public banks can depend on political and social reasons - see Levy Yeyati
et al (2007), La Porta et al (2002) and Barth et al (2001).
At each period private players have information about the state variables and decide
simultaneously to be active or not active in a given market by maximizing an inter-temporal
proﬁt function. Private players know that the entry of public banks do not depend on the
actions of public and private competitors. Private entrants pay a entry cost. The proﬁt
function of the major private players is assumed to be asymmetrically aﬀected by public
and private competitors. This allows us to understand how public banks inﬂuence the
performance of private players.
Closed related models were applied in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Dunne,
Klimek, Roberts and Xu (2013), Gorisankaran, Lucarelli, Schmidt-Dengler and Town (2010),
Collard-Wexler (2013), Ryan (2012) and Kalouptsidi (2013), among others. Aguirregabiria
and Nevo (2010), Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2010) and Pesendorfer (2010) present a rich
discussion on the estimation of dynamic games.
21Market analysts point out that the returns of branches in small markets is quite low. Lower returns in
these markets are explained by high ﬁxed and operational costs and by reduced revenues - see Gonçalves
and Sawaya (2007), Gouvea (2007) and Andrade (2007). This explains why the number of bank branches
is small in the most backward areas of the country.
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4.4.1 Assumptions
 Players. There are two private players, Bradesco and Itau, which are indexed by ipri ∈
{Bradesco, Itau}. There are two public players, Bank of Brazil, BB, and Caixa Economica
Federal, CEF, which are indexed by ipub ∈ {BB,CEF}22.
 Time and markets. Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, ...,∞. There arem ∈M = {1, 2, 3, ..,M}
markets.
 Actions. A player's action in market m, period t is denoted by atim ∈ {0, 1}, where 0
means that a player is inactive; 1 means that a player is active. The 1×N vector atm denotes
the action proﬁle in market m, period t. We sometimes use at−im to denote the actions of all
players but player i.
 State space. The state space is discrete and ﬁnite. We use stm to denote an element of
the state space in market m. When necessary we use Ns to express the number of diﬀerent
possible states in market m.
Transitions. The vector stm evolves according to the transition matrix pm(s
t+1
m |stm, atm),
described by next period distribution of possible values for the vector stm conditional on each
possible current state and actions in municipality m. We sometimes use pm to denote the
vector of transitions, pm(s
t+1
m |stm, atm), for every possible future state st+1m given any possible
(stm, a
t
m).
 Unobservables. In each period players draw a proﬁtability shock εtim. The shock is
privately observed while the distribution is publicly known.
 Payoﬀs of private players. Private player's period payoﬀ is:
Π(atm, s
t
m; Θim) =

piim(a
t
m,x
t
m)
+1(atim = 1)ε
t
im
+1(atim = 1)1(a
t−1
im = 0)Fi.
(4.4.1)
Here piim(a
t
m,x
t
m) denotes player i
′s deterministic proﬁts in market m, Fi are entry costs
and εtim is a proﬁtability shock, which wil be speciﬁed below. Θim denotes the parameters
22We also estimated a version of the model including a fringe of public/private players. The inclusion of
these players does not change our results but increases substantially the state space of our model. This
imposes computational diﬃculties to solve the model and to make conterfactual analysis. By this reason
we do not include these players in the model.
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in the model.
This speciﬁcation captures the main aspects of our idea. An incumbent deciding to stay
in the market receives period proﬁts of piim(a
t
im = 1, a
t
−im,x
t
m)+ε
t
im. An entrant receives the
same proﬁt as an incumbent but minus the sunk entry cost Fi. Any player that is outside
and considers re-entering the market has to pay a ﬁxed cost23.
The term piim(a
t
m,x
t
m) is a linear function of exogenous states and actions
24
piim(a
t
m,x
t
m) =pi0i + pipub1i
∑
j∈ipub
atjm
+ pipri1i
 ∑
j 6=i,j∈ipri
atjm
+ pi2ixtm
 · 1(atim = 1). (4.4.2)
Here pikji ∈ Rk are parameters and xtm is a demand shifter. This speciﬁcation allows for
diﬀerent competition eﬀects of public and private players.
The proﬁtability shock εtim is assumed to have three components:
εtim = µim + ηit + ξ
t
im,
where, µim is a term that varies only across markets and players but not over time, ηit is
a time varying player speciﬁc term and ξtim ∼ EV (0, 1) is an idiosyncratic shock iid across
individuals, time and markets. This is the only source of asymmetric information in the
model. The ﬁrst and the second elements of εtim are known to the players and capture
respectively (i) the correlation of the proﬁtability shocks in the same market across time
and (ii) correlation of the proﬁtability shock across time in diﬀerent markets. Both eﬀects
are empirically justiﬁed by the signiﬁcance of state and year dummies in the reduced forms
analyzed above.
The time varying shock is included to capture the fact that the decision structure of the
chains can be centralized: First, the general conditions of the economy are observed; second
the decision in which municipality(ies) to enter/exit is taken. The model captures the feature
that a better (worse) macroeconomic landscape can increase (decrease) the probability of
23We assume that players leaving the market get a scrap value equal to zero. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki
(2013) discuss identiﬁcation problems of entry costs, scrap values and ﬁxed costs in dynamic entry games.
24Similar structures were used in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003, 2008), Ryan (2012) and Collard-
Wexler (2013).
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being active in all available markets.
We impose a structure on the time eﬀect by further assuming ηit = ηix¯t, where xt =∑
m xmt, is the total payroll of the municipalities in our sample in a given year. The process
for the shock is:
εtim = µim + ηix¯t + ξ
t
im
The parameters of interest are Θim =
{
Fi, pi0i, pi
pub
1i , pi
pri
1i , pi2i, µim, ηi
}
. We sometimes de-
note payoﬀs as Π(atm, s
t
m; Θim) = Π˜(a
t
m, s
t
m)Θim + 1(a
t
im = 1)ξ
t
im, where Π˜(a
t
m, s
t
m) is a
1×Np vector and Np is the number of parameters in market m.
We do not structurally model the behavior of public banks. Entry decisions of public
banks are assumed to do not depend on the number of public and the number of private
competitors in the market. We do not specify the payoﬀ structure of public players. Our
model accommodates all possible motivations for public banks' actions.
 Sequence of period events. The sequence of events of the game is the following:
1. States are observed by all the players.
2. Each player draws a private proﬁtability shock εtim.
3. Actions are simultaneously chosen. Players maximize their discounted sum of period
payoﬀs given their beliefs on competitors' actions. The total payoﬀ of a private player
is given by the discounted sum of player's period payoﬀs. The discount rate is given
by β < 1 and is the same for all players.
4. After actions are chosen the law of motion for stm determines the distribution of states
in the next period; the problem restarts.
Next the equilibrium for this game is characterized.
4.4.2 Equilibrium characterization
We restrict attention to pureMarkovian strategies. This means that players' actions are fully
determined by the current vector of state variables. Intuitively, whenever a player observes
the same vector of states it will take the same actions and the history of the game until
period t does not inﬂuence the player's decisions.
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 Public players. Public players' behavior are exogenously given. Entry probabilities of
public players are known to the private players and do not depend on the actions of other
public/private players.
Private players. Private player i's best response solves the following Bellman equation:
Max
at
i
=k∈{0,1}

∑
at−im
σim(a
t
−im|stm)Π(atim=k, at−im, stm; Θim)+
βzk (s
t+1
m |stm;σim,pm) EξVim (σim,pm)
 . (4.4.3)
Here Π(·) is player's period payoﬀ; the function σim(at−im|stm) accounts for i's beliefs on
other players' actions given current states; σim is a vector that contains the beliefs for all pos-
sible combination of players actions given any possible state in marketm; zk (s
t+1
m |stm;σim,pm)
is a 1 × Ns vector containing the transitions σim(at−im|stm)pm(st+1m |atim = k, at−im, stm) and
EξVim (σim,pm) is a Ns × 1 vector with the expected continuation value for the player,
EξVi(s
t+1
m ;σim,pm,Θim), for all s
t+1
m .
The conditional value function, conditional on action k ∈ {0, 1} being played, is given by:
V kim
(
stm;σim,pm
)
=∑
at−im
σim(a
t
−im|stm)Π˜(atim=k, at−im, stm)Θim (4.4.4)
+βzk
(
st+1m |stm;σim,pm
)
EξVim (σim,pm) + 1(k = 1)ξ
t
ik.
We also deﬁne V˜ kim (s
t
m;σim,pm) = V
k
im (s
t
m;σim,pm)−1(k = 1)ξtik as the conditional value
function net of the iid proﬁtability shock, 1(k = 1)ξtik.
We deﬁne EξVim (σim,pm) as the ex-ante value function, that is, EξVim (σim,pm) =
∆im
(
Π˜imΘim + E˜ξim
)
, where ∆im = [INs − βZim]−1; Π˜im is a Ns×Np vector stacking cur-
rent payoﬀ expected values,
∑
at+1
im
σim(a
t+1
m |st+1m )Π˜(at+1m , st+1m ), for every st+1m ; E˜ξim is aNs×1
vector stacking E˜ξ (s
t+1
m ;σim,pm) =
K∑
k=0
σim(a
t+1
im = k|st+1m ;σim,pm)E
[
ξt+1im |at+1im = k, st+1m
]
for
every st+1m ; INs is a Ns×Ns identity matrix; and Zim is a Ns×Ns matrix stacking the 1×Ns
vector z (st+2m |st+1m ;σim,pm) containing the transitions σim(at+1m |st+1m )pm(st+2m |at+1m , st+1m ) for
every st+1m .
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The solution to problem (4.4.3) implies that player i's probability of playing action k = 1
when states are stm satisﬁes the following equilibrium restrictions:
Him(a
t
i = 1|stm;σim,pm) =
1− exp
{
−exp
{
V˜ 1im (s
t
m;σim,pm)− V˜ 0im (stm;σim,pm)
}}
. (4.4.5)
This holds for all stm ∈ Sm and all i ∈ ipri.
The solution to this problem is a vector of player i's optimal actions when the player faces
each possible conﬁguration for the state vector stm and has consistent beliefs about other
players actions in the same states of the world.
By stacking up best responses for every player and every state a system of 1 × 2 · Ns
equations can be formed. This system is used to ﬁnd the 1× 2 ·Ns vector of players' beliefs.
A formal proof of the existence of this vector can be found in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2008). Equilibirum uniqueness, however, is not guaranteed. This is a common
feature of entry games. The estimation procedure is designed to deal with the multiplicity
of equilibria.
4.5 Econometric Model
This section describes identiﬁcation and the estimation procedure. To estimate the model
we use the estimator developed in Sanches, Silva an Srisuma (2013). Sanches, Silva and
Srisuma (2013) show that there can be substantial computational gains when the ALS ob-
jective function developed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) is speciﬁed in terms of
expected payoﬀs instead of choice probabilities. They also show that under the assumption
of linear-in-the-parameters payoﬀs, the proposed estimator have the familiar OLS expression.
The estimator is easy to implement and reduces signiﬁcantly the computational burden.
4.5.1 Identiﬁcation
Following the CCP approach (Hotz and Miller (1993)) we ﬁrstly identify the vector of entry
probabilities for public and private players and the transitions directly from the data. For
the identiﬁcation of entry probabilities we need to introduce two assumptions:
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Assumption (i): There are no unobserved common knowledge states.
Assumption (ii): The same equilibrium is played in all available markets.
These identifying assumptions follow Ryan (2012). Pesendorfer (2010), Aguirregabiria and
Nevo (2010) and Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2010) discuss the importance of the assump-
tions above.
Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) relax assumption (i). Our reduced form evidence suggests
that our results are robust to the inclusion of market, time and player level unobservables.
This mitigates our concern with unobservables.
Regarding assumption (ii), we could deal with the multiplicity problem by estimating the
model for each market separately, as proposed by Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
The main problem is that because we do not observe frequent entry and exit movements
for a given market, we could not accurately identify the reduced form parameters. In our
application it is necessary to pool the data of diﬀerent markets. Our approach to pool data
follows the earlier literature including Collard-Wexler (2013) and Ryan (2013).
Under these assumptions the identiﬁcation of Θim follows from Pesendorfer and Schmidt-
Dengler (2008).
4.5.2 Estimator
We use the estimation principle developed in Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2013) to recover
players' payoﬀs. We start by representing the equilibrium restrictions (4.4.5) as a linear
function of the payoﬀ parameters. By inverting the function on the LHS of (4.4.5) and
substituting V˜ 1im (s
t
m;σim,pm) and V˜
0
im (s
t
m;σim,pm) equation (4.4.5) can be written as:
y(stm;σim,pm)−D(stm;σim,pm)Θ
′
im = 0, (4.5.1)
where, y(stm;σim,pm) is a real valued diﬀerentiable function that depends only on states,
beliefs and state transitions and D(stm;σim,pm) is a real valued 1×Np vector that depends
only on states, beliefs and state transitions. These functions are deﬁned in the appendix.
As in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) we assume that {(σˆim, pˆm)}m∈M are consis-
tent and asymptotically normally distributed estimators for the beliefs and state transitions
in all the markets25. We deﬁne yˆimt = y(s
t
m; σˆim, pˆm) and Dˆimt = D(s
t
m; σˆim, pˆm) and sum
25As in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) we assume that consistency and asymptotic normality is
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and subtract yˆimt − DˆimtΘ′im from (4.5.1) to write:
yˆimt = DˆimtΘ
′
im + uˆimt, (4.5.2)
where, uˆimt =
(
yˆikmt − DˆimtΘ′im
)
− (yimt −DimtΘ′im), with yimt = y(stim;σim,pm) and
Dimt = D(s
t
m;σim,pm).
By stacking equation (4.5.2) for all the markets, states and players OLS can be used to
recover Θ
′
im. Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2013) show that the OLS estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normally distributed when the number of observations used to compute
{(σˆim, pˆm)}m∈M tends to inﬁnity.
4.5.3 CCPs and the state space
Following the CCP approach the empirical implementation of the model depends on (i) the
estimation of beliefs and actions for each player, respectively, Him(a
t
i = 1|stm;σim(·)) and
σim(a
t
−im|stm) and (ii) the estimation of a transition process for the exogenous states, psm(·).
Next our estimation procedure for these elements is discussed.
Reduced form estimation of beliefs
We estimated equation (4.3.1) pooling the two private players, Bradesco and Itau. The data
include the markets where Bradesco was active for at least one period and the markets where
Itau was active for at least one period26.
Instead of including year dummies we included xt =
∑
m xmt, the total payroll of the
municipalities in our sample in a given year, to control for the correlation in the decisions of
private players in the same period of time. Instead of including state dummies we constructed
4 categories of markets. These market dummies keep the dimensionality of the state space
low. Our market category deﬁnition follows the approach in Collard-Wexler (2013).
The market categories are deﬁned according to the number of potential competitors in a
given market27. More speciﬁcaly, ifNm is the number of potential competitors in municipality
obtained when the time series dimension of the observations used to compute {(σˆim, pˆm)}m∈M goes to
inﬁnity.
26This follows the deﬁnition of potential markets deﬁned in section 4.3.
27Our deﬁnition of potential competitor is based on the super eﬃcient estimator in the section 4.3 - i.e. the
number of potential competitors in municipality m is equal to the maximum number of players that were
active for at least one period in municipality m since 1900.
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m then M1m = 1 if Nm ≤ 2; M2m = 1 if 2 < Nm ≤ 4; M3m = 1 if 4 < Nm ≤ 6; and M4m = 1
if Nm ≥ 7. With this deﬁnition we can substitute µm =
∑4
k=1 γkMkm. The same strategy
was used in Collard-Wexler (2013)28. The vector xmt includes only municipality payroll.
Entry decisions for public players were estimated using the same speciﬁcation but excluding
npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 from the set of covariates. We pooled the dara for the two public players,
Bank of Brazil and Caixa Economica Federal. The data include all markets where either BB
or CEF were active during at least one period.
We estimated the logits for the samples 1988-2010 and 1996-2010. The sample 1996-2010
excludes the hyperinﬂation period and allows us to focus on the more recent market trends.
The logit model coeﬃcient estimates for the public and private players are reported in the
appendix.
State space and state transitions
Two distinct estimation strategies for the structural model parameters are explored: First,
we exclude time and market eﬀects as in Ryan (2013); second we use market dummies and
the sample payroll to control for market and time eﬀects. Both strategies are based on the
empirical CCP estimates. Only the structural parameters for the private players, Bradesco
and Itau, are estimated.
 Strategy 1: Model without time and market eﬀects. The state space for any
private player, i ∈ ipri, is composed by the following elements:
sti ∈
{
at−1i ,
{
at−1j
}
j 6=i , x
t, {I(i = k)}k∈ipri
}
Here {I(i = k)}k∈ipri is a set of private players dummies and xt is the municipality payroll.
The other elements are the actions of player i in period t− 1, at−1i , and the actions of player
i's competitors in period t− 1, {at−1j }j 6=i. The variable xt is discretized in 10 deciles.
The law of motion for xt is estimated by a simple auto-regressive ordered logit. This
formulation for the law of motion of xt ignores potential eﬀects of banks, either public or
private, on municipality income.
The state space of this model is composed by 2 · 23 · 10 · 2 = 320 elements.
 Strategy 2: Model with time and market eﬀects. The second model includes
28Collard-Wexler (2013) discusses potential endogeneity problems arising from the deﬁnition of the market
dummies.
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time and market eﬀects. Market eﬀects are captured by 4 market dummies. Time eﬀects
are captured by the sample payroll. Market dummies and the sample payroll variables were
deﬁned above - see section 4.5.3. The state space in this model is:
stim ∈
{
at−1im ,
{
at−1jm
}
j 6=i , x
t
m, x¯
t, {I(i = k)}k∈ipri , {I(m = k)}
4
k=1
}
Here {I(m = k)}4k=1 is a set of market dummies for the 4 market types; x¯t =
∑4
m=1 wmx
t
m
is the sample payroll, where, wm is the number of markets of type m and x
t
m is the average
payroll of type m markets in period t; at−1im is player i's action in a market of type m in t−1,{
at−1jm
}
j 6=i are the actions of player i's competitors in the same market in period t − 1 and
{I(i = k)}k∈ipri is a set of dummies for each private player.
The law of motion for xtm is calculated using an auto-regressive ordered logit structure.
The variable xtm is discretized in four percentiles for each market type. A model for each
market type was estimated. Finally x¯t was calculated using x¯t =
∑4
m=1wmx
t
m under the
assumption that wm is ﬁxed over time.
The estimation of the model with market dummies is time consuming because the inclusion
of the sample payroll, which depends on the realization of the payroll variable in every market,
increases exponentially the dimension of the state space. The state space has 2 ·23 ·44 ·2 ·4 =
32768 elements.
4.5.4 Results
We imposed an annual discount factor β = 0.9. To focus on the more recent trends of the
market we used the CCPs and state transitions estimated with the 1996-2010 sample. The
CCPs of the non strategic public players correspond to models I and II in the second block of
Table 4.11 - those estimated using the sample 1996-2010. For the private players the CCPs
are given by models I and II in the second block of Table 4.12. We used the OLS estimator
to estimate the model.
Parameters are estimated in units of the scale factor in the EV distribution and do not have
a level interpretation. Only relative magnitudes matter. Standard errors of the parameters
were calculated by block bootstraping CCPs and state transitions 100 times. The structural
model was estimated 100 times, one for each block bootstrap draw of beliefs and state
transitions. The standard error across this set of parameters was calculated. A similar
procedure was applied in Ryan (2012) and Collard-Wexler (2013).
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Table 4.5 reports the structural parameters estimates. The ﬁrst column corresponds to
the model without market unobservables. The second column shows the model with market
dummies and the sample payroll, estimated according to strategy 2.
Qualitatively, both speciﬁcations produce similar results. The main diﬀerence is that
in model I, the market payroll coeﬃcient is negative but small and not signiﬁcant. All
models predict that the entry of a new private competitor reduces the proﬁts of the private
incumbent. The entry of a new public player increases the proﬁts of a private incumbent.
The constant term, which measures operational costs, is negative and relatively larger in the
second model. Entry costs are also negative and relatively larger in the second model. The
contribution of the components of the shock in the second model is relatively important. The
coeﬃcient attached to the sample payroll is positive. This coeﬃcient estimate means that
increases in the sample income shifts to the right the distribution of the shock and increases
entry rates. Market eﬀects are positive.
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Table 4.5: Structural Parameters for Private Players
(I) (II)
Proﬁt Components
N Public 0.0605 0.0726
[0.01] [0.00]
N Private -0.0487 -0.0256
[0.01] [0.00]
Market Payroll* -0.0001 0.0019
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant -0.3720 -0.5821
[0.01] [0.05]
Shock Components
Sample Payroll* 0.0004
[0.00]
Market 1 0.2377
[0.04]
Market 2 0.2104
[0.03]
Market 3 0.1176
[0.02]
Entry/Player Costs
Entry Costs -4.9272 -5.7442
[0.09] [0.02]
Dummy Bradesco -0.0270 -0.0245
[0.01] [0.02]
Observations 320 32768
Note: (*) Sample payroll measured in R$ bil-
lions of 2011; market payroll measured in R$
millions of 2011. Standard-errors in brackets.
Standard errors obtained from 100 block boot-
straps of beliefs and transitions. Parameters
are measured in units of standard deviations of
the iid proﬁtability shock.
To facilitate the interpretation of these results, the next table reports the estimates as
percentage of entry costs. All the coeﬃcients are divided by the entry costs.
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Table 4.6: Structural Parameters as Percentage of the Entry Costs
(I) (II)
Proﬁt Components
N Public 1.228% 1.264%
N Private -0.988% -0.446%
Market Payroll* -0.002% 0.033%
Constant -7.550% -10.134%
Shock Components
Sample Payroll* 0.007%
Market 1 4.138%
Market 2 3.663%
Market 3 2.047%
Entry/Player Costs
Entry Costs 100.000% 100.000%
Dummy Bradesco -0.549% -0.427%
Note: (*) Sample payroll measured in R$ billions
of 2011; market payroll measured in R$ millions of
2011.
Again, the predictions of both models are quite close. Entry of a new public player
increases proﬁts of the private incumbent in around 1.3% of the entry costs. Entry of a
new private player reduces proﬁts of the private incumbent in around 0.45-0.9% of the entry
costs.
The next table provides proﬁt estimates for the private banks using the structural param-
eters. These parameters allow us to estimate a measure of return over entry costs. We also
simulate the number of years necessary to recover entry costs.
Table 4.7: Average Period Proﬁts and Return to Fixed Costs in Private Monopoly Markets
(I) (II)
Period Proﬁts in Std Deviations 0.1936 0.2493
Period Proﬁts as % of Entry Costs 3.930% 4.339%
Years to Recover Entry Costs 26.0 23.0
Note: Average proﬁts of a private monopoly in a small market
(market in the lower market payroll decile). Period proﬁts as %
of entry costs corresponds to the period proﬁt in std deviations
divided by the entry cost. To calculate the number of years to
recover the entry costs we assumed a discount rate of 0.9, that
the market payroll is increasing steadily at 3% per period and
a monopoly structure every period.
The average period payoﬀ of the private banks in monopoly markets is computed in the
the ﬁrst line of the table. The results show that the second model predicts larger proﬁts. The
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second line shows that model I predicts returns to the entry investment of 4% in monopoly
markets. Model II predicts that returns over entry costs are slightly larger, around 4.4%29.
The third line shows the number of years necessary to recover the entry costs. We assumed
β = 0.9 and that municipality and sample payroll are growing steadily at 3% per year. We
accumulated the discounted payoﬀs and computed the number of years that are necessary to
recover the estimated sunk entry costs. Model I predicts that in monopoly markets it takes
on average 26 years for the private player to recover the sunk entry investment. Model II
predicts that a private player needs on average 23 years to cover the sunk entry cost30.
4.5.5 Discussion
Two remarkable facts arise from our analysis:
1. Public players complement private players;
2. Private players crowd-out other private players.
The ﬁrst result shows that proﬁt of public banks are positively aﬀected by the number of
public branches in the same market. Our estimates do not allow us to disentangle the details
of the spill-over channels. Broadly speaking, our ﬁndings are consistent with public banks (i)
having monopoly over a number of important Federal funds and (ii) being driven by social,
as opposed to strategic or market reasons. The ﬁrst element guarantees a large volume
of credit for small markets - see Feler (2012). The second induces product diﬀerentiation
between public and private banks: Public and private banks target diﬀerent clients - see
Coelho, Melo and Rezende (2012). In this case, the amount of cheap credit and public
transfers poured in by the public banks into small isolated municipalities shifts the demand
29To calculate proﬁts we ﬁxed the sample payroll at its 2010 average value in smaller markets, that is in
markets of type 1. For model II we assumed that the market dummy for markets of type 1 is equal to
one. Thus the results are calculated for markets type 1. The sample payroll is used only to compute
proﬁts in model II and is equal to the sample payroll of 2010.
30This means that entry barriers are quite high. A recent expansion plan of Bank of Brazil illustrates this
point. BB set down R$1 billion to construct 600 new branches in the Brazilian territory. This implies
that on average each new branch costs R$1.66 million.
Notice also that the potential demand of a small market is quite small: The average yearly payroll of
a market in our sample was R$9 million in 2010 and only a small fraction of the population demands
banking services. In 2011 the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA, 2011), an institute of the
Brazilian federal government, estimated that around 40% of the Brazilian population has no access to
any kind of banking services. This percentual can be even large in the markets represented in our sample.
102
for banking services, making these markets more attractive for private players. This eﬀect
induces the entry of private players.
The second result shows that private banks are competitive.
These ﬁndings contrast partially with the ﬁndings in Coelho, Mello and Rezende (2012).
They extend the traditional Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) framework and estimate an entry
model using a cross-section of small and medium Brazilian municipalities. This approach is
related to ours, but in that paper the analysis is static and relies purely on cross-sectional
variation31. They ﬁnd that the presence of a private competitor reduces signiﬁcantly proﬁts
of private incumbents. In contrast, the presence of a public competitor has a very small,
but signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect on proﬁts of private incumbents. They conclude that public
banks are not competitive.
4.6 Model Fit and Counterfactual
This section uses the structural model to construct a policy experiment. We are interested in
the following question: What happens with the supply of private ﬁnancial services in small
isolated markets when public banks are privatized?
First, we solve the model using the estimated parameters. The solution to the model is
a vector of Ns entry probabilities that solves the system of implicit best responses given by
equation (4.4.5).
For models with a large state space this exercise is not computationally feasible. The
state space of model II has dimension Ns = 32768. Solving this model goes beyond current
computational capabilities. The time to solve the model increases exponentially with the
state space. From now on, we use only model I, that has a reduced state space (Ns = 320),
to compute the counterfactual experiments.
4.6.1 Model ﬁt
We solved the system (4.4.5) for private banks entry probabilities. This system is non linear.
This means that its solution is not necessarily unique.
31The number of municipalities in Coelho, Mello and Rezende (2012) is substantially larger than ours.
In their sample only state capitals and metropolitan areas are excluded. To construct our sample we
select only municipalities that are at least 20 km away from the nearest municipality. State capitals and
metropolitan areas are excluded.
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To check how the multiplicity aﬀects our conclusions, we proceed in the following way:
First, we solve model I for the entry probabilities using the logit probabilities as the initial
guess; second, we perturbed the logit probabilities; third we computed again the solution for
the model using the perturbed vector of logit probabilities as the initial guess; fourth, we
compared the perturbed solution with the original solution32. In doing so we ﬁnd that the
solutions were identical for any initial guess.
We compare the solution obtained from the structural model with the logit probabilities
for all available states. The next table illustrates some statistics of our predictions.
Table 4.8: Fitted vs Sample (Logit) Probabilities
(I)
Correlation Fitted and Logit Probabilities 99.91%
Average Sum of Squared Errors 0.05%
Average Sum of Errors 0.82%
Note: Correlation between the probabilities obtained from the
solution of model I and the logit model (model I, Table 4.12 for
1996-2010) for each state (320 states). Average sum of squared
errors gives the sum of the squared diﬀerence between the logit
and the model probabilities for each state averaged across states.
The average sum of errors gives the sum of the diﬀerences be-
tween the logit and the model probabilities averaged across the
320 states.
The ﬁrst line reports the correlation between the logit probabilities and the solution of
the structural model for all states. The second line reports the average squared diﬀerence
between the logit and the structural probabilities. The third line reports the average sum of
these diﬀerences. The ﬁtting of the model is very good. The correlation between the logit
and structural probabilities is high. The average error of the structural probabilities is below
1%.
We performed an additional exercise. We took the smallest market in terms of sample
payroll and assumed that in the ﬁrst period all the four banks are out of the market. We used
ﬁrstly the probabilities predicted by the logit models and simulated 1000 paths 100 periods
ahead of private banks actions and then we constructed an average path taking the mean
across the 1000 paths. We did the same using the probabilities predicted by the structural
models. The next ﬁgure compares the paths implied by the logit and by the structural
32Firstly we multiplied the original guesses (calculated from the CCPs showed above) by several factors
between 0 and 1. We also started the model with a ﬁxed guess, where the probabilities for all the
states and for all the players are equal to 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. We used the same procedure to compute
the counterfactuals.
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model.
Figure 4.2: Number of Private Banks 100 Periods Ahead - Model I
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Note: Number of private banks in a small market starting from a state where all the
competitors are out of the market. Paths 100 periods ahead simulated 1000 times using
the structural and the logit probabilities for model I. The ﬁgure shows number of private
branches averaged over 1000 simulations.
The ﬁgure shows that the path obtained from the structural model is close to the path
obtained from the reduced form logit models in the ﬁrst 30 periods. Subsequently the path
of the structural model is below the path produced by the logit model. The structural
model predicts that after 100 years this small market, without any public/private branch in
operation in the ﬁrst period, will have on average 1.32 private branches. The logit predicts
that the same market will have 1.45 branches.
Next we use this model to construct counterfactuals.
4.6.2 Counterfactual: Privatization of public banks
This section analyzes the eﬀects of the privatization of both public banks on the total supply
of ﬁnancial services in small isolated markets. We assumed that each public bank is bought
by diﬀerent players: BB is bought by one player and CEF by the other. We assumed that
the coeﬃcient attached to the number of public competitors in the structural model is equal
to the coeﬃcient attached to the number of private competitors. The entry probabilities of
public players, instead of being generated by an exogenous process, are calculated according
to the system of best responses showed in equation (4.4.5).
We calculated the equilibrium probabilities for 4 players. Now, this calculation depends
on the solution of a system of 640 equations and 640 unknown variables. To check how
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multiplicity aﬀects our conclusions we used the procedure described in Section 4.6.1. In
all experiments the resulting equilibrium did not change33. These probabilities are used to
simulate 1000 paths 100 periods ahead. The next ﬁgure shows the path for the total number
of branches, public plus private, after and before the privatization. We computed this path
for a small market where the initial state is characterized by zero active players.
The exercise shows that in the long-run the total number of active branches in small
municipalities drops from 3 to 0.5 on average. This means that with the privatization
around 50% of the Brazilian small municipalities would not be attended by any bank branch.
To assure that all these small municipalities would have at least one bank branch in the
counterfactual world where public banks are bought by strategic players the government
should give a subsidy of 8% over the operational costs of all active branches in the market.
Using the fact that the structural model predicts that operational costs are around 7.55% of
entry costs and an estimate of R$1 million for the entry costs we calculated that the present
cost of this policy is around R$349,463.51 per municipality34.
Figure 4.3: Counterfactual: Privatization of Public Players
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Note: Number of branches (public plus private) in a small market starting from a state
where all the competitors are out of the market (baseline and privatization counterfac-
tual). Paths 100 periods ahead simulated 1000 times using the structural probabilities
for model I. The ﬁgure shows number of private branches averaged over 1000 simula-
tions. Branches privatization shows the total number of branches if public branches are
privatized. Branches baseline is the total number of branches (public plus private) using
the structural model I for private players and the non strategic behavior assumption for
public players (calculated based on the logits in Table 4.11, model I, sample 1996-2010).
33Locally it is expected that the equilibrium is unique as the number of equilibria is generically ﬁnite. Thus
equlibria are isolated points.
34Present values for a time horizon of 100 years and using a discount factor of 0.9 per year.
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4.7 Conclusions
This paper explores microdata of 1002 isolated markets in Brazil to estimate a dynamic
entry game for public and private banks. We recover players' payoﬀs. The model is solved
for the equilibrium entry probabilities. The market equilibrium is evaluated under the coun-
terfactual scenario where public banks are privatized.
Three main conclusions emerge. First, public banks generate positive proﬁt spill-overs for
private banks; second, private banks crowd-out private competitors. Our estimates show
that the entry of a public bank in a given market increases the return of a private incumbent
by 1.2 percent and the entry of a private bank reduces the return of a private incumbent by
0.05 to 1 percent. Third, the counterfactual in which public banks are sold to private players
shows that the total number of active branches operating in the long-run in a typical small
market drops from 3 to 0.5 on average.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
 y(stm;σim,pm) and D(s
t
m;σim,pm) functions.
The functions y(stm;σim,pm) and D(s
t
m;σim,pm) in equation (4.5.1) are deﬁned as:
y(stm;σim,pm) =
ln
{
ln
[
1
1−Him(ati = 1|stm;σim,pm)
]}
−
β
[
z1
(
st+1m |stm;σim,pm
)− z0 (st+1m |stm;σim,pm)]∆imE˜ξim,
which is a real valued diﬀerentiable function that depends only on states, beliefs and
transitions and,
D(stm;σim,pm) =∑
at−im
σim(a
t
−im|stm)Π˜(atim = 1, at−im, stm)+
β
[
z1
(
st+1m |stm;σim,pm
)− z0 (st+1m |stm;σim,pm)]∆imΠ˜im,
which is a real valued 1×Np diﬀerentiable vector that depends only on states, beliefs and
transitions.
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Appendix 2: Reduced Form Estimates
Table 4.9: Marginal Eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 on the Entry Probabilities of Private Players
(Bradesco and Itau) - Subsample npub ≥ 1
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Nº Public 0.11467*** 0.12303*** 0.15040*** 0.14810***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Nº Private -0.04343* -0.02822 -0.07914** -0.07935**
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Player Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Trend*State Dummies No No Yes Yes
Transfers, Expenditure, Agric. Prod. No No No Yes
Observations 9,348 9,164 9,164 9,162
Pseudo R2 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.92
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant at 10%. Marginal eﬀects calculated
at the sample means. Clustered standard errors at the municipality level in brackets. All the models have
lagged activity, number of public and private competitors and municipality payroll. Subsample npub ≥ 1
includes all municipalities that had at least one public player in every period.
Table 4.10: Marginal Eﬀects of npubmt−1 and n
pri
mt−1 on the Entry Probabilities of Private Players
(Bradesco and Itau) - Subsample 1 ≤ npub ≤ 3
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Nº Public 0.19269*** 0.18806*** 0.20575*** 0.21391***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Nº Private -0.05677* -0.06105* -0.12490*** -0.11986***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Player Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Trend*State Dummies No No Yes Yes
Transfers, Expenditure, Agric. Prod. No No No Yes
Observations 7,301 7,117 7,117 7,115
Pseudo R2 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.92
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant at 10%. Marginal eﬀects calculated
at the sample means. Clustered standard errors at the municipality level in brackets. All the models
have lagged activity, number of public and private competitors and municipality payroll. Subsample
1 ≤ npub ≤ 3 includes all municipalities that had at least one and at most three public players in every
period.
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Appendix 3: CCPs
Table 4.11: CCP Logit for Public Players (BB and CEF)
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Sample:1988-2010 Sample:1996-2010
Lagged Activity 6.75*** 6.73*** 6.88*** 7.22***
[0.09] [0.10] [0.12] [0.14]
Market Payroll 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Sample Payroll 0.07*** 0.17***
[0.01] [0.01]
Market 1 -1.15*** -1.17***
[0.26] [0.32]
Market 2 -1.09*** -1.45***
[0.23] [0.29]
Market 3 -0.64*** -0.88***
[0.22] [0.26]
Dummy BB 1.35*** 1.68*** 1.82*** 2.22***
[0.11] [0.13] [0.14] [0.17]
Constant -3.70*** -3.56*** -4.55*** -5.58***
[0.12] [0.25] [0.16] [0.33]
Observations 20,357 20,357 13,680 13,680
Pseudo R2 0.793 0.796 0.815 0.827
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant
at 10%. Clustered standard errors in brackets. Model I does not
include sample payroll and market dummies. Model II includes
these variables.
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Table 4.12: CCP Logit for Private Players (Bradesco and Itau)
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Sample:1988-2010 Sample:1996-2010
Lagged Activity 7.44*** 7.32*** 8.05*** 8.17***
[0.12] [0.13] [0.18] [0.20]
N Public 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.46*** 0.63***
[0.05] [0.07] [0.06] [0.08]
N Private -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.57*** -0.35**
[0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.15]
Market Payroll 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Sample Payroll 0.08*** 0.03**
[0.01] [0.01]
Market 1 -0.42 0.98**
[0.32] [0.38]
Market 2 -0.12 0.85***
[0.26] [0.32]
Market 3 0.13 0.51**
[0.21] [0.26]
Dummy Bradesco 0.05 0.04 -0.51*** -0.52***
[0.11] [0.11] [0.13] [0.13]
Constant -3.84*** -4.43*** -3.41*** -4.84***
[0.11] [0.39] [0.13] [0.46]
Observations 15,919 15,919 10,595 10,595
Pseudo R2 0.828 0.831 0.830 0.831
Note: (***) Signiﬁcant at 1%; (**) signiﬁcant at 5%; (*) signiﬁcant at
10%. Clustered standard errors in brackets. Model I does not include
sample payroll and market dummies. Model II includes these variables.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The thesis investigates Industrial Organization questions. The ﬁrst essay (chapter 2) uses a
static framework to analyze market eﬀects of Brazilian Biodiesel regulation. In the second
essay (chapter 3) we propose an estimator for dynamic games. In the third essay (chapter 4)
we use the estimator developed in the second paper to estimate an dynamic oligopoly model
for the banking industry in Brazil.
To the best of my knowledge, no written work has used the data set I use in the ﬁrst
essay to analyze the welfare impacts of the biodiesel regulation. The results obtained are
important as they show that the positive gains of the biodiesel producers are oﬀset by the
loss of surplus from consumers, wholesalers and retailers. These results, however, should be
taken with caution. First, due to data constraints it is not possible to study the dynamics
of this industry. Therefore, the results obtained are supposed to hold only in the short run.
Second, the paper does not consider the eﬀects of the regulation in the other part of the
production chain. Small farmers, for example, may have welfare gains due to implementation
of the biodiesel regulation. Finally, the environmental beneﬁts are also not computed. Future
work should deal with this questions, specially regarding the dynamic nature of this industry.
The estimator proposed in chapter 3 can be very useful in applied work. Monte Carlo
experiments show a signiﬁcant reduction in the computation time. The gains are specially
important when the payoﬀs are linear in parameters, the practical leading case. In this
case our estimator assumes a familiar OLS / GLS form. The estimator, however, cannot
accommodate unobserved heterogeneity and suﬀers with small sample bias, two common
problems in a two step estimator.
Chapter 4 has an important contribution as it uses a structural model to predict the eﬀects
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of privatization policies. To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers using a similar
approach to answer this kind of question. However, even after controlling for all observable
variables, there may be some unobservable heterogeneity biasing the results. Future work
should look for ways to control for these unobservables.
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